

Incentive to Mobilise?

The Effects of Proportional Representation on Party Activity in New Zealand

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Abstract: Much of the comparative literature on turnout suggests that party mobilization efforts can explain the turnout advantage among electoral systems that use proportional representation (PR). Not only do PR systems encourage the formation of more parties that have an incentive to mobilize everywhere, but citizens are also assumed to be more easily persuaded to vote where “every vote makes a difference”. In contrast, it is generally assumed that citizens in single member plurality systems (SMP) are less likely to be mobilized because there are fewer parties competing for votes in fewer (competitive) districts. We examine this question in New Zealand by comparing reported contact by political parties before and after the introduction of proportional representation. While parties no longer focus on the most competitive districts, as they had done in the past under first past the post, the overall level of party mobilisation is lower under PR. These results have implications for our understanding of how electoral systems alter party strategy and influence overall voter turnout.

Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, October 16-19, 2003. Vancouver, British Columbia. I would like to thank Jack Vowles, Shaun Bowler, and Susan Banducci for helpful comments. Further revisions can be found at <http://www.jkarp.com>. For correspondence, contact Jeffrey Karp via email at the address above or by post: Department of Political Science, 113 Holden Hall, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas 79409-1015.

Introduction

Voter turnout is higher in countries with proportional representation (PR) systems than in first past the post (FPP) systems. Depending on the countries and elections analysed, proportional systems are estimated to have a turnout advantage of between seven and nine percent (Lijphart 1999; Blais and Carty 1990; 284-5; Jackman 1987). This higher level of turnout under PR is one of the more robust findings in the comparative electoral systems literature. But while scholars agree over what impact PR may have, there is much less certainty over the mechanism that produces such higher turnout. The most likely suspect, in terms of mechanism, is that of party competition and an increased level of party campaigning that occurs in multi-party PR systems. New Zealand's shift from FPP to MMP permits a direct test of the impact of electoral institutions because it controls for country-specific factors that might also influence the relationship between party mobilisation and the electoral system. In this paper we compare party campaigning before and after the introduction of MMP to examine how the change in the electoral system influenced party strategies and their influence on voter behaviour.

Turnout and party mobilisation

In principle, parties should expend greater effort on mobilizing voters when the expected benefits of turning out voters will be greatest, relative to the costs i.e. when extra votes are likely to turn into extra seats for the party (for a review see Cox 1999). Therefore, competitive elections and electoral formulas that ensure greater proportionality between seats and votes should increase the efforts parties expend on contacting voters. Because voters respond to the cues they receive from parties about the competitiveness of the election, this process leads to higher turnout. For example, parties are likely to make greater campaign efforts in mobilizing supporters and converting potential supporters when the election is close and a few extra votes may make the difference between winning and losing. More voters are likely to vote if parties put more effort into mobilizing voters As Denver and Hands (1974, 35) argue: "Higher turnout in marginal seats is rarely the product of a 'rational' appreciation

of the situation by voters, but results from parties creating greater awareness amongst voters or simply cajoling them into going to the polls.”

More competitive elections and a proportional translation of seats to votes assures that PR systems would encourage greater mobilisation efforts. Because every vote counts in PR, parties have an incentive to mobilise everywhere, resulting in more competitive elections (Gosnell 1930; Tingsten 1937). First past the post (FPP) systems, by contrast, typically favour a two party system where only a relatively small number of seats are marginal (Downs 1957). In these systems, parties have a strong incentive to concentrate their resources on marginal or competitive races and neglect those where the outcome is more certain. In those districts that are non-competitive, voters have less of an incentive to vote and parties have less of an incentive to mobilise (Powell 1980, 12). This was the case in New Zealand under FPP. Voters in competitive (or “marginal”) electorates were more likely to be visited or contacted by telephone by political parties (Denemark 1998, 92). Turnout was also higher in marginal electorates than in safe electorates (Vowles 2002, 102-103).

Aside from encouraging a higher level of mobilisation effort, party contacting is assumed to be more effective in PR systems. Not only is there likely to be a bigger payoff in terms of extra votes translating in seats, it may take less effort to convert potential voters to actual voters in PR systems. It has long been suggested that PR systems enhance political efficacy because votes are not wasted (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 1999). Greater stores of efficacy may make it easier for parties in PR systems to persuade potential supporters to vote. Additionally, party supporters may be persuaded to turn out to maximize the party’s representation in parliament. Even if the party cannot win a majority, every vote can translate into seats that give useful bargaining power over coalition arrangements. By contrast, in plurality systems, parties that are not in a competitive position may find it difficult to persuade potential supporters to go to the polls since their votes may be perceived as making little difference to the outcome. Parties that have little chance of winning but nevertheless attempt to mobilize support for their cause may do so not primarily to influence the outcome but instead to register a protest with the political establishment. Their potential supporters,

however, who are likely to be disillusioned with the political process, may be more difficult to mobilize.

Party Campaign Strategy and Effectiveness

Assessments about what impact party mobilisation has on turnout depend not just on how many citizens are reached by parties but also on who is contacted. There is ample evidence from the United States to suggest that the effectiveness of party canvassing is limited because parties tend to contact members of the electorate who are active in politics and thus predisposed to vote (Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, see also Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). Nevertheless, parties in the U.S. continue to invest heavily in canvassing efforts and most survey based studies show that reported contact by a party has a positive impact on turnout even when controlling for an individual's likelihood of voting (Kramer 1970, Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson 1990, Goldstein and Ridout 2002, Rosenstone and Hansen 1983, Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). After examining the effect of party contacting from 1952 to 1990, Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994, 220) conclude that "contrary to most of the literature heralding the demise of political parties, their effectiveness in mobilizing voters has increased over the last 40 years" especially in presidential election years. Field experiments in the U.S. beginning with Gosnell (1927) have demonstrated that citizens are more likely to vote when they are contacted. Experimental studies that compare the type of contact made indicate that canvassing (personal contact) is more effective than mail and telephone contacting (see Eldersveld 1956, Miller, Bositis and Baer 1981, Gerber and Green 2000). There is also evidence that canvassing tends to increase turnout among occasional voters but not chronic non-voters (Niven 2001) and that contacts closer to the election tend to be more effective (Niven 2002).

Evidence from countries other than the U.S. about party canvassing and turnout is less voluminous in comparison. Some of this literature focuses on turnout but other studies focus on the impact of local campaigning on a party's share of the vote. Evidence based on a field experiment during local elections in the UK suggest that party canvassing can

appreciably increase turnout (Bochel and Denver 1971, 1972) but others emphasize the relative unimportance of party canvassing when compared to television appeals (McAllister 1985). Whitely and Seyd (1994) find that local campaigning efforts had more of an influence on the distribution of votes rather than overall turnout. In an aggregate analysis that measures local campaigning effort as the number of volunteers available, Carty and Eagles (1999) find that opposition candidates benefit the most from local canvassing efforts.

We know very little about the way in which parties seek out voters (Rohrschneider 2002). What kinds of voters, then, are parties likely to target? Campaign finance laws cap the amount that parties can spend in a campaign. Therefore, parties have an incentive to reduce the costs of mobilisation efforts by targeting probable voters and targeting voters that are less costly to reach. Several voter characteristics may make them easier to contact or identify as probable voters: voters in previous elections, those who live in cities, members of groups such as unions are some examples of characteristics that could be used to identify probable voters and those potential voters who are easier to contact. Previous voters are likely to vote again so contacting efforts are going to be more cost effective. Identifying “a voter” is only one step in the decision process and demographic traits such as previous voting history are not the only ways of distinguishing possible voters. Voters may also be staunch partisans or relatively non-partisan or “independent”. If parties pursue a mobilisation strategy (as opposed to a conversion strategy) they are likely to contact members of the population that are predisposed to vote, support their candidate and get others to vote (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Voters most likely to be contacted are thus ones who have well established party loyalties. If parties pursue a conversion strategy, they will focus their efforts on those who are most likely to be influenced by campaign literature or a personal appeal. These are likely to be individuals who have weak or no party loyalties.

Party Activity Before and After MMP

Because individual country studies cannot explicitly test institutional effects, the mechanism linking electoral systems to mobilisation efforts is more a matter of conjecture

than empirical findings. The evidence based on single country studies, while suggestive, does little to tell us about the relative rates of contacting across various political systems. While we know that turnout is higher under PR than under other systems we do not know why that is so. Indeed, in general, we know very little about either the effects of the electoral system on party mobilisation efforts or, at the micro-level, about party attempts to mobilize voters across different systems. We can address this question by examining how party strategies changed before and after the introduction of MMP.

We have two main hypotheses of interest in relation to the argument that it is party competition that generates higher turnout under PR. For party mobilisation efforts to be the mechanism that produces higher turnout, we must see two patterns. First, MMP should be associated with generally higher levels of campaign activity and, second, that campaign activity promotes turnout. If this is not the case then we have ruled out party campaigning as the mechanism by which PR produces higher turnout.

Since 1993 the NZES has included a battery of questions asking respondents whether they were contacted by a political party during the campaign. In 1993 the NZES asked respondents whether they had received a personal visit or a telephone call during the election campaign from Labour, National, Alliance, or New Zealand First. In 1996, the NZES included an additional battery asking respondents whether they had received either letters or pamphlets. The number of parties was also expanded to include three new parties; ACT, Christian Coalition, and United. The format remained the same in 1999, while dropping the Christian Coalition and United from the survey. In 2002, the Greens and Progressive Coalition were added to the battery. These differences in the number of parties are a consequence of the change in electoral system and reflect the evolution of the party system. If our expectations are correct, the increased number of parties competing for votes should lead to an increase in the proportion of voters mobilised during the campaign.

Table 1 reports how the method of party contact varies over the last four elections. In the 1993 general election, prior to MMP, about one out of every ten voters reported a personal visit while 14 percent reported receiving a telephone call. Very few voters (less than two

percent) reported receiving both a telephone call and a personal visit suggesting that parties were not targeting their efforts on a narrow group of voters. In total about a quarter of the electorate had some contact with a political party in the last FPP election. Since then, the proportion reporting party contact has dropped substantially. In 2003, less than seven percent of the electorate was contacted by a political party through telephone calls or personal visits, despite the increase in the number of parties competing for votes under MMP. In 1996, nine out ten voters received some form of mail from any of the parties; by 2002 the proportion dropped to 78 percent. These figures indicate a decline in party mobilisation since the advent of MMP, a trend which is inconsistent with the expectations outlined above.

Table 1: Party Mobilisation Over Time

Method of Contact	Year of Election			
	1993	1996	1999	2002
Visit	10.1	11.3	6.2	3
Telephone	14.1	11.7	7.5	4
Mail	na	91.4	81.8	78.3
Personal visit or telephone	23.5	20.7	12.9	6.7
n	2245	4911	3173	4275

Under FPP, parties were more likely to focus their efforts on the most competitive seats. Figure 1 shows the how party mobilisation was distributed across the electorates in the last election held under FPP. In the most competitive electorates, where the winning margin was less than five percent of the vote, between 20 and 70 percent of the voters were contacted by parties. In electorates where the winning margin exceeded 15 percent, no more than 30 percent of the voters were contacted. Parties under FPP, however, did not entirely ignore the safer seats; about 20 percent of the voters reported being contacted in many of the electorates that would have been considered safe.

In contrast, in 2002 under MMP, there is no relationship between competitiveness in the electorates and party mobilisation. The explained variance is less than one percent and the slope of the regression line is almost completely flat. Note that in 2002, the average winning margin increases to 25 percent, up from 15 percent in 1993. This indicates a substantial decline in competitiveness which could explain why so few voters were contacted by parties.

Altogether the results indicate a pattern consistent with expectations; the geographic focus of party efforts under FPP disappears entirely under MMP. However, contrary to our expectations, fewer voters are reached by parties under MMP.

(Figure 1 here)

Table 2 provides evidence that the parties are spending less money within the electorates than in the past. Campaign finance laws prevent the parties from spending more than \$20,000 to promote each constituency candidate. However, parties spent on average, considerably less. National outspent Labour by almost a third, averaging almost \$14,000 per electorate. As Table 2 shows, this was roughly equivalent to what the party spent in the previous election. Reflecting its defensive posture, National also devoted more of these resources to the marginal electorates. In contrast, Labour spent about 20 percent less in 2002 and spread its resources more evenly, averaging less than \$10,000 per electorate. The only party to have increased its expenditures from 1999 was the Greens, though the overall spending averaged less than \$2,000 per electorate. Act spent less than in the past and concentrated its resources on the marginal electorates. Altogether the parties spent about a quarter less than in the previous election in the electorates. This reflects a pattern consistent with the last election, where spending in the electorates fell by seven percent (Vowles 2002b, 104). As for broadcasting, the parties receive an allocation to purchase air time based on how well the party performed in the previous election, current polls, and party membership. The total allocation remained relatively unchanged from the previous election, though some parties, such as the Greens received almost three times the allocation they had in the past. With the exception of the Alliance and to some extent the Greens who allocated some of their funds to radio, the parties choose to spend their allocation almost entirely on television advertisements.

Expenditures are limited and must be declared by the parties for their national campaigns covering advertising, additional broadcasting production costs, and publication costs. A party nominating a list and a full slate of electorate candidates can spend up to \$2,380,000, which includes \$20,000 for each electorate candidate. This amount is on top of

the \$20,000 allowed to promote the candidate within the electorate, discussed above. A party running fewer electorate candidates therefore loses the entitlement to spend \$20,000 nationally for each electorate it does not contest. The limit of expenditure also excludes funds spent on travel, surveys and polls, and the replacement of damaged or vandalised election materials. No party spent up to its limit. Act was the biggest spender, up about 60 per cent from its 1999 declaration. National's expenditure was a little less than half of its 1999 budget, a huge decline. Labour's was up 30 per cent, and New Zealand First and Green up 60 per cent. The flow of the votes away from National and toward the smaller parties appears to have been anticipated by the flows of funds to at least some of the parties concerned.

(Table 2 here)

All this expenditure is, by definition, national, although it would have paid for pamphlets and other expenses that parties could choose to target. Aside from geographic focus, we might expect parties to target their efforts to certain voter characteristics, depending on whether their strategy reflects mobilisation or conversion. If parties focus on a strategy of mobilisation they are likely to focus their efforts on mobilising their own partisans; whereas if parties adopt a strategy of conversion they will focus on either non partisans or other partisans. Table 3 shows the relationship between party contact and partisanship in 1993 and 2002. In both elections, parties were more likely to contact their own partisans than other partisans or non partisans. In 1993, for example, Labour contacted 20 percent of their own partisans, compared to just 11 percent of other partisans and 11 percent of non partisans. This strongly suggests that Labour was more intent on mobilising their primary base rather than reaching out and converting new voters. Under MMP, although Labour contacted fewer voters, the strategy appears to be very much the same. National also adopted a similar strategy in both elections though the party was somewhat less successful in reaching its own partisans. While one might expect smaller parties to place more emphasis on conversion than larger parties, they appear to place just as much emphasis, if not more, on contacting their own partisans. Under FPP, for example, Alliance contacted 17 percent of its own partisans compared to just 6 percent of citizens identifying with another party. Under MMP, the

Greens, Act and the Alliance contacted about 5 percent of their own partisans while reaching virtually no one who either identified with another party or considered themselves to be non partisan.

(Table 3 here)

Table 4 examines rates of personal contact across a range of other voter characteristics under both FPP and MMP. The results are consistent with the international evidence that suggests that parties are more likely to contact those who are predisposed to vote. Regardless of the electoral system, citizens who have voted in the previous election are more likely to be contacted than those who did not participate. As discussed earlier, parties that adopt a mobilisation strategy may target politically active people because they are easier to motivate to get to the voting booth and they are more likely to convince their friends to vote. Also, parties may just find it easier to locate politically active people from lists of campaign contributors or party members. Although the rate of contact is much lower under MMP, the differences are somewhat larger; previous voters are twice as likely to be contacted than non voters. Younger voters are also less likely to be contacted than voters who are middle aged while citizens over the age of 50 are somewhat less likely to be contacted. As one might expect, parties are also more likely to focus their efforts in areas of greater population density such as large cities as compared to rural areas. Home owners are more likely to be contacted. Finally, NZ Europeans are more likely to be contacted than Maori voters, though the differences appear to be somewhat greater under FPP than under MMP. Most likely this reflects the lack of competition in the Maori electorates under FPP. Finally, union members do not appear to be more likely to be mobilised than non union members.

Table 4: Characteristics of Voters Contacted by Parties

	Personal Contact (%)	
	1993	2002
Previous voter	24.7	5.8
Previous non voter	19.6	2.9
Strong Identifier	25.9	5.7
Non Partisan	21	4.5
Male	22.9	5.1
Female	24.7	5.3
Age 18 to 29	17.1	3.3
Age 30-39	20.6	4
Age 40-49	20.2	5.5
Age 50-59	15.6	7.2
Age 60-69	13.3	6.7
Age 69 and above	12.3	6.6
Urban	27.9	8.1
Town	12.3	6.9
Country	16.6	5.2
Own home	25.1	7.4
Rent home	19.3	5.4
Maori	20.7	4.2
NZ European	24.2	5.2
Union member	24.5	8.6
Non union member	23.4	7

If parties concentrate their efforts on just those who are likely to vote then the potential influence of such efforts on turnout is likely to be small. Nevertheless, parties invest a great deal in canvassing and the evidence reviewed so far suggests that their intention is to mobilise support. To evaluate the impact, if any, of mobilisation on turnout we test a model of voter turnout, controlling for many of the factors that may have an influence on party contact. Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression is used to estimate the models. To ease the interpretation of the coefficients we also report first differences which represent the maximum change in probability in the value of the independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their means.

As we see in Table 5, party mobilisation has no influence on an individual's likelihood of voting under FPP, when controlling for other factors that are known to influence

voter turnout. Under MMP, however, party canvassing is statistically significant but small. As the results in Table 5 show an individual's probability of voting on average increases by about two percent when contacted by telephone or through a personal visit. These effects are largely minimal as parties and candidates appear to contact those who are most likely to vote (see Table 3). In models not reported here, the coefficient for contact doubles in size when other variables are omitted from the model. The results also reveal that contact through letters or pamphlets has no influence on the likelihood of voting. The finding that personal contact is significant under MMP but not under FPP is largely consistent with our theoretical expectations. It may be easier for parties to persuade citizens to vote when "every vote makes a difference" than in cases where an individual's vote will have little chance of influencing the outcome of an election. Ironically, although party contact has the potential to make a difference under MMP, parties choose to contact fewer voters.

(Table 5 here)

To further examine the effects of party mobilisation we can compare an individual's voting intentions measured during the campaign to his or her reported vote measured in the post election wave of the survey. The NZES surveyed 4782 electors over the five weeks prior to the election and 76 percent were surveyed again after the election forming a pre-and post-election panel. If party mobilisation has any influence, we should observe differences between those who report being contacted by parties through either personal visits or by post.¹ These panel data provide a stronger test of the effects of party mobilisation than the cross sectional analysis reported above.

Table 6 shows the proportion of voters who voted consistently with their original party preference and those who were either converted from another party preference or mobilised among the undecided. As the results reveal, most of the parties were had at least some success in mobilising support among the undecided. For example, of those who were undecided who were contacted by Labour, 26 percent voted for Labour compared to 20 percent who were not contacted. The Greens were even more successful. Fifteen percent of those undecided voters contacted by the party gave the Greens their party vote as compared to

just five percent who were not contacted. Undecided voters were also twice as likely to vote for New Zealand First or Act when contacted by that party. National proved to be the exception with fewer undecided voters being mobilised to vote for the party. All of the parties with the exception of Labour managed to retain a larger proportion of their voters through party mobilisation. This is to be expected as we have seen that the parties concentrate their efforts on the strong partisans. Nevertheless there are some notable differences. The Greens, for example retained the support of 71 percent of their voters through party contact but lost almost half of their voters who were not contacted during the campaign. Consistent with our earlier findings, the results show that few voters were converted from one party to another. Only the small parties, who were seen to place more emphasis on conversion, were successful in converting voters from another party. Although the overall proportions are small, party contact nevertheless makes a difference. On average, voters contacted by a party were twice as likely to be converted as those who were not contacted.

Table 6 here

Conclusion

Advocates of PR have long argued that voters are more likely to be mobilized in proportional systems because there are more parties competing for votes. This has led to the assumption that there is greater mobilisation under PR because of the increased competition in multi-party systems. The New Zealand case provides a unique test of this theory because it allows one to compare party activity under two types of electoral systems. While factors other than the electoral system may be responsible for some of the differences we have observed, our analysis indicates that party mobilisation does not increase under PR. Since the adoption of MMP, there has been a notable decrease in the proportion of citizens who report being contacted by parties, particularly those who report being contacted in person. Parties have adapted in some ways to the new rules; consistent with theoretical expectations, parties under MMP are less likely to concentrate their efforts on the most competitive electorates. Instead, parties appear under MMP to contact voters at the same rate regardless of the competitiveness of the electorate. Nevertheless the rate of contact is far lower than under the safest seats in

FPP. Such a finding forces us to reconsider the potential for FPP systems to foster party mobilisation even though there may be differences depending on the competitiveness of the electorates. We have seen, however that parties are more likely to pursue a mobilisation strategy than a conversion strategy. Regardless of the electoral system, parties are more likely to contact their own partisans than reach out to wavering or less committed voters. They are also more likely to focus their efforts on those who are predisposed to vote which reduces the potential for parties to stimulate overall turnout. Nevertheless, party mobilisation does make a difference both in terms of mobilising turnout and to a less extent converting voters. Under MMP, it appears that parties are more successful in increasing the likelihood of an individual going to the polls, controlling for other factors that are known to have an influence on voting. These effects, however, are rather small and are only evident through personal forms of contact, whether it be through a personal visit or a telephone call. Ironically, it is precisely this form of canvassing that has seen the most substantial decline over the last few elections.

While our analysis has been based entirely on the New Zealand case, the findings are nevertheless consistent with those based on data from other sources. Using data from other national election studies, we examined whether citizens were more likely to report being contacted by a political party in seven countries representing PR and SMP systems (Karp, Banducci and Bowler 2002). The results were generally consistent with the findings presented here. Citizens in Britain, Canada, and the United States were far more likely to be contacted by a political party in a national election campaign than in PR list systems. We also observed similar findings when comparing list based systems to candidate based systems using data from European Elections (see Karp, Bowler, and Banducci, 2003).

These findings lead us to conclude that party mobilisation is not responsible for the higher turnout observed in PR systems. Such a pattern presents a puzzle for our understanding of turnout since, plainly, the higher levels of turnout under PR cannot be associated with higher levels of party campaigning under PR. Indeed, turnout would be even lower in FPP systems if it were not for party mobilisation. One possible explanation for this result is that parties and candidates must work harder to mobilize voters when turnout is low. In New

Zealand, overall turnout has been declining since 1984 except for an increase in 1993 at the time of the MMP referendum and during the first election held under MMP in 1996. The shift to PR in New Zealand may have had the effect of raising turnout temporarily, but has not reversed the earlier trend. Turnout may still be higher than it would have been had New Zealand retained first past the post. The decrease in turnout is consistent with the decline in party mobilisation. While there are other factors that may explain the decline (see Vowles 2002), it is evident that the decline in party activity is partly responsible. As we have seen, parties can and do stimulate turnout. The question remains how to provide greater incentives for parties to reach out to the voters.

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Endnotes

¹ Unfortunately we were not able to include a measure of party contact in the pre-election wave so we do not know whether respondents were contacted by parties before or after their initial interview.

Table 2: Campaign Expenditures in 2002 and Percentage Changes from 1999

	Electorate					Parties		Broadcast			
	\$000	% Change	Correlation with Competitiveness		Correlation	\$000	% Change	\$000	% Change	% Radio	% TV
			PV	EV	Contact						
National	953	1.7	0.43	0.37	-0.12	1052	-103.0	616	3.2	16.6	83.4
Labour	678	-17.1	0.04	0.12	0.14	1475	30.0	614	1.4	17.5	82.5
ACT	233	-26.4	0.33	0.33	-0.01	1625	60.0	167	28.4	18.5	81.5
Alliance	60	-78.7	0.15	0.12	0.26	115	-547.0	100	-48.5	60.9	35.1
NZ First	139	-60.1	0.45	-0.11	-0.17	301	64.0	153	41.5	0.0	98.9
Green	114	19.6	0.14	0.05	0.04	598	61.0	167	288.2	27.1	72.6
United	74		0.10	0.10	-0.12	94	44.0	75		20.3	75.2
Others	241	-43.2				369	26.0	164	-45.9		
Total	2492	-22.7	0.45	0.32	0.08	5629	5.0	2057	3.7		

Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission

Table 3: Mobilisation of Partisans and Non Partisans

<i>FPP, 1993</i>									
Contacted by	Personal Contact Only			Mail Only			All		
	Identify with Party	Identify with other Party	Non Partisans	Identify with Party	Identify with other Party	Non Partisans	Personal Contact	Mail	Total
Labour	20.3	11.6	11.4	NA		NA	13.6	NA	NA
National	16.7	13.4	10.9	NA		NA	13.3	NA	NA
Alliance	17.4	5.9	5.2	NA		NA	6.1	NA	NA
NZ First	9.5	2.2	1.9	NA		NA	2.2	NA	NA

<i>MMP, 2002</i>									
Contacted by	Personal Contact Only			Mail Only			All		
	Identify with Party	Identify with other Party	Non Partisans	Identify with Party	Identify with other Party	Non Partisans	Personal Contact	Mail	Total
Labour	4.5	2.6	2	71.2	60.9	62.2	2.8	64.1	65.5
National	3.1	2.8	2.7	62.2	53.1	50.6	2.8	53.8	55.2
Green	4.7	0.06	0.3	54.2	33.2	31	0.6	32.8	33.1
NZ First	1.1	0.03	0.3	36.8	25.6	23.8	0.3	25.1	25.3
Act	6.2	1.7	1.3	63.1	45.7	43.3	1.6	44.9	45.7
PC	0	0	0.1	90	14.7	14.6	0.1	14.8	14.8
Alliance	6.7	0.04	0.6	33.3	21.8	21.1	0.5	21.5	21.8

Table 5: Estimating the Effect of Party Contact on Voting: Logistic Regression Coefficients



	2002				1993			
	Coef.	S.E.	Odds	Prob	Coef.	S.E.	Odds	Prob
Education	0.14 ***	(0.03)	1.15	0.05	0.17 ***	(0.03)	1.19	0.10
Age	0.01 ***	(0.00)	1.01	0.04	0.02 ***	(0.00)	1.02	0.13
Female	-0.27 **	(0.11)	0.76	-0.01	0.32 **	(0.14)	1.37	0.03
Union member	0.33	(0.21)	1.39	0.02	0.03	(0.15)	1.03	0.00
Voted in previous election	2.25 ***	(0.13)	9.52	0.28	1.48 ***	(0.15)	4.41	0.22
Strength of partisanship	0.57 ***	(0.06)	1.76	0.08	0.39 ***	(0.07)	1.48	0.11
Maori	-0.43 **	(0.20)	0.65	-0.03	-0.54 **	(0.25)	0.59	-0.06
Personal contact	0.51 *	(0.29)	1.66	0.02	0.14	(0.17)	1.15	0.01
Postal contact	-0.18	(0.11)	0.84	-0.01				
Constant	1.43 ***	(0.33)	4.17		0.51	(0.36)	1.66	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.24				0.22			
n	5246				1888			

Table 6: Influence of Party Contact on Vote Choice: Intended Vote by Party Vote

Party Vote	Intended Vote							
	Not Contacted				Contacted			
	Undecided or Non Voter	Same Party	Another Party	n	Undecided or Non Voter	Same Party	Another Party	n
Labour	19.8	79.8	8.9	765	25.5	75.5	7.7	1071
National	19.6	62.9	4	410	13.6	69.3	4.2	449
Green	5.4	54.2	1.2	171	15.3	71	2.5	125
NZ First	9.8	74.3	3.5	287	16.1	75	6.8	139
Act	7.2	69.2	2.2	133	14.1	62.1	4.6	173
PC	1.5	41.9	0.09	49	0	78.9	2.1	26
Alliance	1.9	46.2	0.05	30	0	43.8	2.1	23

Source: Pre and post campaign survey

Figure 1: Relationship between Party Mobilisation and Competitiveness



Note: The Maori electorates have been excluded