

Candidate Effects and Spill-Over in Mixed Systems:
Evidence from New Zealand

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Abstract: Although mixed member proportional (MMP) systems offer several advantages they also have one potential problem that threatens the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Some suggest that these systems suffer from a “contamination effect” where candidates have the potential to influence the party list vote which ultimately determines the partisan composition of parliament. This paper examines this theory in New Zealand which has conducted four elections under MMP. The analysis is based on district level data merged with individual level data. The findings suggest that although many voters do not have an opinion of candidates, those who do are likely to evaluate incumbents and party leaders more positively. While these factors can also have an influence on the party list vote, the overall effect is quite limited.

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Introduction

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral systems are considered by some to be “the best of both worlds” because they combine single member district representation with proportional outcomes (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). They have become increasingly popular as a means of election to legislative assemblies. Generally, voters in these mixed systems cast two votes: one for the party list and another for a candidate standing in a single member district (SMD). These systems are attractive because they combine the advantages of both electoral systems single member district representation together with proportional representation (PR), and help to offset some of the disadvantages associated with each type of system (Bawn, 1999, pp. 490-491).

While such a system may be attractive for the reasons discussed above, it also has some potential disadvantages. Some have expressed concerns that voters can be confused by the existence of two sets of rules which translate their votes into seats, and such confusion can discourage participation, produce results that are not consistent with voters’ preferences, and undermine system legitimacy (Cox and Schoppa, 1998). Others have suggested that mixed systems suffer from “contamination” effects that alter the incentives of parties and voters (Ferrara and Herron 2005). In this view, the combination of two sets of electoral rules are not truly independent from one another. Cox and Schoppa (2002) find that German parties consistently run SMD candidates everywhere even when their candidates have little chance of winning. The decision to “go it alone” rather than withdraw is intended to boost their share of the party list vote by either putting a human face on the party and/or possibly benefiting from voter confusion (Ferrara and Herron 2005). If this strategy is effective, then it raises a potential problem for MMP systems, where the party list vote is used to determine the partisan balance in the legislature.

It is largely assumed that PR systems encourage “sincere” voting where voters are likely to choose the party they most prefer (Cox 1997). In cases where party preference may be

inconsistent with choice, voters are assumed to be acting strategically. For example, in Germany or New Zealand, where parties must win five percent of the vote to gain representation, voters may be willing to vote for a second preference to help that party cross the threshold (Blais, Loewen, Bodet 2004; Cox 1997, 160). In the SMD contests, where competition is likely to be reduced to two viable candidates, voters are more likely to cast a strategic vote when their first preference is not viable in order to defeat their least preferred candidate. Popular candidates may also encourage voters to split their votes. The difference is that voters who opt to support another party's candidate do so not because that candidate offers a more viable alternative but rather because they have a preference for that candidate. Either way, voters are likely to split their votes by voting for another party's candidate on the SMD side while voting for their sincere preference on the party list vote. (see Karp et al. 2002).

The contamination thesis assumes, conversely, that candidate effects can have an influence on the party list vote. Parties may improve their party's overall prospects by running candidates in SMD contests even if they have little chance of winning. In a mixed system that allows for dual candidacies, where the same candidate can appear on a list and in an SMD context, one might expect parties to field their best candidates (Ferrara 2005). Popular candidates, by virtue of their incumbency or popularity may either have 'coattails' or they may be better at mobilizing the party's base (Cox 2005). In addition, candidates who appear on the party list who have a poor chance of winning in an SMD race may nonetheless have a strong incentive to campaign for the party list vote (Cox 2005). Either way, one should expect candidate effort to pay dividends for the party. In an MMP system, where the party list vote is used to achieve proportionality, if spill-over occurs it could have a nontrivial effect on the overall partisan composition of the legislature

Such a view assumes that candidate effects and incumbency matter and have the potential to influence how voters view political parties. The thesis also predicts that voters are likely to cast straight votes when a party has a strong candidate. On the other hand, if candidates matter to

voters then there may be a risk to parties running weak candidates. In such cases, voters may be more likely to desert the candidate and the candidate's party. Thus the contamination thesis predicts that candidate effects spill-over thereby reducing the likelihood that voters will cast split votes.

Most of the studies examining these contamination effects have focused on party strategy. For example, Ferrara and Heron (2005) examine strategic entry across a more diverse set of mixed systems while Cox and Schoppa (2002) examine the number of parties entering SMD contests in Japan, Italy and Germany. Both studies find that parties are more likely to contest SMD races than would otherwise be expected. These studies imply that there is an electoral advantage to running candidates in hopeless races. However it is not at all clear whether and to what extent candidates can boost their party's party list vote. Cox and Schoppa (2002, 1034) suggest that parties in Japan that compete in the SMD tier increased their party list vote by about six percent. The problem in assessing such an impact is that if parties are selective they are likely to contest elections where they have the strongest base of support. Thus, the relationship between contesting seats and vote share may well be spurious. Another problem is that if parties believe they must contest seats everywhere then there may be little variation across districts to test the hypothesis. In Germany, for example, the small parties run candidates in virtually all of the districts. Given the lack of variation, it is not possible to determine what effect if any contesting a race has on the party list vote. For this reason, Hainmueller and Kern (2006) restrict their analysis of contamination effects in Germany to party incumbency. They find that incumbency results in a gain of about 1 to 1.5 percent in the party list vote share which they claim is enough to trigger significant shifts in Bundestag majorities. The problem here is that the analysis is restricted to the two largest parties because they are the only ones that have had success in winning constituency seats.

The New Zealand Case

In this paper I examine the potential for constituency candidates to influence the party vote in an MMP system. The analysis relies on data from New Zealand, which has had an MMP system since 1996. New Zealand had previously had a single member plurality system where two parties--National and Labour—located on the right and left respectively dominated New Zealand politics since the 1930s. In the 1980s, growing dissatisfaction with both parties gave rise to smaller parties which produced increasingly disproportional results creating the impetus for electoral reform (see Vowles et al. 1998).

Under MMP, while the large parties are likely to run candidates in all of the districts, the smaller parties are more selective. As can be seen from Table 1, the smaller parties are likely to contest about three-quarters of the seats. The number of contested electorates has been declining somewhat in recent elections reflecting the changes in their electoral viability. Act, a liberal party advocating lower taxes and privatization is perceived as being to the right of the National party while the Alliance and the Greens are to the left of Labour. Progressive Coalition represents a newly formed party led by Jim Anderton who had previously been the party leader for the Alliance but had left the party in early 2002 after internal divisions led to its collapse. Both New Zealand First, a populist party that had held the balance of power following the 1996 election and United Future are widely perceived as being centrist parties. Unlike their counterparts in Germany, the smaller parties have been successful in winning constituency seats, though the winners have generally only been those leading the smaller parties.¹

(Table 1 here)

¹ The co-leader of the Green Party, Jeanette Fitzsimmons, won an electorate seat in 1999 but lost it in 2002. Winston Peters, the leader of New Zealand First, had held a constituency seat in Tauranga since 1984 but was defeated in 2005. The leader of Act, Richard Prebble, won the Wellington Central seat in 1999 but lost in 2002. Jim Anderton who leads the Progressive Coalition and formally lead the Alliance (1993-2001) has been successful in holding a constituency seat. Similarly, Peter Dunne, the leader of United, is an electorate MP.

Although New Zealand voting choice is shaped much more by strong parties than by voter candidate preferences independent of party, electoral districts are relatively small, with approximately 30,000 voters on average. Contact with members of Parliament is as high as that of members of the U.S. House of Representatives in which electoral contests are highly candidate-centered and under the previous FPP system there was some evidence of a personal vote (Vowles et al., 1995, 161). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect contamination or spill-over, if it occurs, to be evident in New Zealand.

As stated earlier, the contamination literature has relied entirely on aggregate data. As an alternative approach, this analysis relies primarily on district-level data merged with individual level data from the New Zealand Election Study (NZES). The design of the NZES is well suited for this purpose. Respondents are sampled from each of the 69 electorates and there is a sufficient sample within each electorate for analysis. An individual level approach avoids the pitfalls of ecological inference by allowing one to more directly assess how the presence of candidates or incumbency influences opinions about specific candidates and in turn the likelihood of voting for that candidate's party.

Candidate Characteristics

The contamination literature assumes that simply running a candidate in an SMD race will produce positive dividends for the party. Beyond that, various candidate characteristics may matter to voters. It is well known, for instance, that incumbents everywhere have an electoral advantage though the size of the advantage varies from one context to another. In part this is assumed to depend on the magnitude of the "personal vote" conferred by greater familiarity, personal regard, and reputation for competent performance (Desposato and and Petrocik 2003). The literature on the U.S. Congress emphasizes the importance that members of Congress attach to constituency service in cultivating a personal vote. Outside the U.S., legislators may also have an electoral incentive to provide constituency service depending on whether a candidate is

directly elected (Carey and Shugart 1995). Heitshusen, Young, and Wood (2005, 40) find that compared to other MPs in SMD systems, electorate MPs in New Zealand were likely to place the highest priority on constituency service. They suggest that this may be explained by the competition faced by rival list MPs in their electorates who also engage in constituency service. There may also be a difference in the priorities that different legislators attach to constituency service. Surveys of legislative candidates in New Zealand suggest that electorate candidates are far more likely to attach importance to casework than list candidates; 52 per cent of electorate candidates believed helping with individual problems was a very important part of an MP's job, compared to just 21 per cent of list candidates (Karp 2002). Moreover, electorate MPs in New Zealand receive greater financial resources to engage in constituency service than list MPs (Ward 1998). This suggests that electorate MPs may be able to build a larger "personal vote" than list MPs giving them a greater incumbency advantage. Aside from constituency service, public images of MPs may diverge. Following the first MMP election, cartoons, TV political satire, and the print media contributed to a growing perception that there were two types of MPs and that list MPs were 'second-class' (see Ward 1998). In part, these perceptions may have been shaped by their perceived lack of legitimacy.

Aside from incumbency, other candidate characteristics may play a role in shaping public perceptions of candidates. In some countries women are more likely than men to express a willingness to vote for a female candidate (Burrell 1996; Welch and Studlar 1988). Experimental research finds that women candidates are perceived to be more compassionate on social issues and more liberal than men (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). This gender stereotyping also underlies the role of candidate gender as a cost-cutting decision heuristic; when compared to their male counterparts in the same party, women candidates perform better among voters on the left and worse among voters on the right (McDermott 1997). Repeat challengers may also be better known and more experienced at campaigning. In the U.S. repeat challengers are likely to raise more money and improve on their previous vote share Mack (1998). Finally, a growing body of

research on leadership effects in parliamentary systems summarised by McAllister (1996) suggests that party leaders can have an influence on electoral outcomes. Party leaders then may be more positively evaluated than others and these evaluations may spill-over onto the party list vote.

District Level Analysis

To examine the potential for candidate effects, I first analyze the relationship between candidate and party votes using data from the 2005 election, the fourth held under MMP. Figure 1 plots the percent of the vote for all candidates and parties where each observation represents the percentage of the candidate and his/her party list vote in a given electorate. The broken line represents an equal relationship between candidate and party votes (where $\beta=1$). Electorates above the diagonal line are those where candidates outperform their party while those below the line indicate a weaker candidate or drop-off from the party. There are a considerable number of observations that fall above the line, suggesting that some candidates do indeed outperform their party, though there are also those who under perform. As Figure 1 reveals, the regression line falls slightly lower than the broken line indicating that the relationship between the candidate vote and the party list vote is strong but somewhat weaker than one would expect if there was spill-over. The coefficient (β) for the electorate vote indicates that for every one unit increase in a candidate's share of the vote, the party list vote increases by .87. This suggests that candidates, on average, slightly under perform. Overall the fit of the model is good, with the candidate vote explaining 90 percent of the variance in the party list vote.

(Figure 1 here)

To assess which candidate characteristics have an influence on the party list vote, I estimate a series of regressions for each political party. A dummy variable is used to identify

whether a party stood a candidate in the SMD race.² Dummy variables are also used to identify electorate MPs and those list MPs also contesting electorate seats. Another dummy variable is used to represent party leaders standing in their electorate.³ In the case of the smaller parties, only one MP held a constituency seat and he or she was also the party leader. Other dummy variables are used to identify repeat challengers and whether the candidate is a female. To control for the possibility of spurious relationships, I include a measure of the party list vote in the electorate in the previous election. This is only possible in 2005 as in previous elections, the boundaries were altered due to redistricting.

Another way to examine the impact of candidate characteristics is to examine the extent to which candidates encourage straight ticket voting. A common approach in examining ticket splitting in MMP systems has been to take the difference between a party i 's vote total in district j (PV_{ij}) and the vote total for party i 's candidate in district j (EV_{ij}) (Fisher, 1973; Jesse, 1988; Bawn, 1993; Cox, 1997, 82). One problem with this measure is that it overestimates straight voters by counting straight voting as the overlap between aggregate electorate and party votes (Karp et al. 2002). The New Zealand data provide a more precise estimate. In this case, the number of voters casting a party and electorate vote for the same party is based on the tabulation of actual ballots as reported by the Chief Electoral Office. Thus we have a precise estimate of whether votes cast for a specific candidate correspond to their party's party list vote. From these data we can estimate the percentage of voters casting the same vote for a candidate's party in a given constituency.

The results in Table 2 suggest that the party list vote is somewhat higher in electorates where parties contested electorates. With the exception of National, the difference is the largest for the Greens at two percent while there is no difference in Act or United's share of the party

² The term drops out for Labour as it is the only party to contest all 69 electorates in the 2005 election.

³ For the National party, a dummy variable is used to identify the former party leader, Bill English. Don Brash replaced English as the leader in October of 2003. He is the only party leader who is a list MP and not contesting a specific electorate.

vote. National, which left seven electorate uncontested is an outlier, where the difference is eleven percent. Constituency incumbency also increases the party vote for both of the large parties, though the effect is greater for National. On the other hand, list MPs do not appear to have an influence on their party's share of the vote. Party leadership is also related to party vote though the effects are not always positive. In the case of National, the party vote is over 13 percent lower in Bill English's constituency. The party vote for the Greens is also about two percent lower in Jeanette Fitzsimmons district. In contrast, the party vote for New Zealand First and the Alliance is about two percent higher in their leader's districts. Neither the gender of the candidate nor being a repeat challenger appears to have any effect on distribution of the party vote.

(Table 2 here)

The results of the models predicting straight voting are less clear. Incumbency does not increase the percent casting straight votes for either party. In the case of National, both electorate and list incumbency is associated with more split voting. Act list MPs also appear to be associated with more split voting. The effect for leaders is mixed. There is no significant difference for leaders of the two large parties or the Greens. There is only a positive and significant effect for the Progressive Coalition while the effect is negative for New Zealand First, Act, and United. In these cases, as the percent voting for a party leader in his or her electorate increases the percent casting a straight vote decreases. This can be a sign of strategic voting, as voters who prefer another party cast a sincere vote for their party but then defect and support another party's candidate with their constituency vote either because they want to help that party cross the electorate seat threshold or because they like that particular candidate (see Karp et al. 2002). Either way, the results undermine the contamination thesis which predicts that popular candidates will encourage straight ticket voting.

(Table 3 here)

Candidate Evaluations

These results illustrate the limits of an aggregate approach. They do not tell us much about how candidate characteristics influence public perceptions or voting behaviour. Moreover, although the models predicting party vote control for the previous vote share, it is still possible that the relationships are spurious. These problems can be overcome by using individual level data.

I rely on data from the 2002 New Zealand Election Study (NZES). The overall sample for the 2002 NZES includes 5,533 respondents sampled from the 69 electorates, resulting in an average of 80 respondents sampled from each electorate or constituency.⁴ As a result we are able to match district level information with a reasonable sample of respondents.

To measure preferences for candidates I rely on the following question, “Regardless of the parties they were standing for, and their chances of getting elected, how did you feel on election day about the candidates who stood in your electorate?” Responses range from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). In the 2002 study, respondents were asked to evaluate candidates representing Labour, National, New Zealand First, Act, and the Alliance.⁵ Reflecting uncertainty about candidates, over 40 percent either responded “don’t know” or refused to evaluate candidates representing either of three smaller parties, while 20 percent are missing for National and 16 percent for Labour candidates.

Aside from candidate characteristics, several other variables are included in the models to control for other factors that might influence candidate evaluations. To measure party preference, I rely on an item asking whether a respondent feels close to a political party. While this measure has the advantage of classifying more respondents as “partisan” than the standard Michigan

⁴ The main sample of the NZES is drawn from the electoral rolls stratified by electorate. A pre-election sample that is also carried over into the post election is drawn by a national random sample of households with telephones with respondents randomly selected within households. See Vowles et al. 2004 or www.nzes.org for further details.

⁵ In the cases where the party did not have a candidate standing in the electorate, evaluations if any have been coded as missing.

measure of partisan identification, there are still substantial proportions of the electorate who do not consider themselves close to a party. Very few voters consider themselves to be close to small parties, in particular. Additional demographic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity and education are included in the model as controls.

Table 4 estimates the influence of candidate characteristics for those who provided an evaluation. Labour incumbents are more likely to receive a positive evaluation though the difference is not substantial. In contrast, evaluations for National incumbents are no different for incumbents. Status as list MPs also appear to make little difference. Repeat challengers representing New Zealand First are more positively evaluated but those from Act are more negatively evaluated. Female candidates are no different from their male counterparts.⁶ Party leaders consistently are given more positive evaluations by their constituents. The fit for all of the models, however, is rather poor indicating that attitudes toward the candidates are not well defined by candidate characteristics or demographics. This suggests that candidate characteristics are not likely to play a major role in shaping voting behaviour in New Zealand.

(Table 4 here)

Vote Choice

To assess the effects of candidate characteristics on the party vote, I estimate a series of models predicting vote choice. The decision is modelled as a binary choice, where the dependent variable is coded as “1” for voting for the party in question and “0” otherwise.⁷ Therefore, logistic regression is used to estimate the models.⁸ While candidate evaluations may well be associated with voting for a specific party, the effects are likely to be endogenous. That is, party choice may well influence evaluations of the candidates. To avoid these problems, candidate evaluations are

⁶ Women, however, were likely to rate female Labour candidates higher than male Labour candidates.

⁷ Non-voters are included in the analysis following the assumption that candidates are not only likely to convert votes but they may also be able to mobilize them as well.

⁸ An alternative strategy would be to estimate vote choice using a multinomial logit or probit model. Our interest here though is to estimate the effects of candidate characteristics on the likelihood of voting for a particular party compared to any other rather than against a specific party.

left out of the model. Instead, I rely on the objective characteristics examined above that are not influenced by vote choice.⁹

The results are given in Table 5. Incumbency increases the likelihood of voting for Labour but the effect is small. The decision not to contest an electorate does not appear to reduce the likelihood of voting for the party; in only one case is the effect significant but in the wrong direction. For the Greens, the decision to contest an electorate reduces the likelihood of voting for the party. Repeat candidates have no impact on voting for the parties except for Act where the effect is negative. The gender of the candidates only appears to make a difference for National. In cases where a female candidate stood in the electorate, the likelihood of voting for National decreases somewhat.

(Table 5 here)

Recall that the contamination hypothesis assumes that candidate characteristics will lead to “sticky voting” where voters who are motivated to cast a vote for a particular candidate will also vote for that candidate’s party. Table 6 reports the results of models predicting straight ticket voting. The dependent variable is coded as “1” where a respondent reports voting for the same candidate and party and “0” otherwise. Responses have been dropped in cases where a party did not contest an electorate. Similarly respondents who do not recall casting an electorate vote have been dropped.

The results in Table 6 suggest that voters are more likely to cast a straight vote when Labour incumbents are standing in their electorate. As with the earlier analysis, the gender of the candidate appears to only make a difference in voting for National. Female candidates are less likely to prompt straight ticket voting. In all but one case (New Zealand First) party leaders encouraged straight ticket voting. That we find a consistently positive effect here suggests that there may be fewer defections from the party list vote to the party leader. In other words, those

⁹ A small number of respondents (n=250) did not have an electorate classification. These have been dropped from the analysis.

casting a vote for the party list may also vote for that party's leader in their constituency. The aggregate analysis, which estimates the percentage voting for a party leader who then decide to vote for another party suggested defections in some cases *away* from the leader. More likely, the visibility of party leaders may have prompted votes from other parties. Partisanship, as one would expect, is associated with straight ticket voting while education is negative in two cases and not significant in others.

(Table 6 here)

Discussion

While mixed systems have proven to be popular with electoral reformers, there is a concern that electoral outcomes can be distorted by “contamination effects” whereby SMD contests have the potential to spill-over on the party list vote. This raises a potential problem particularly with the MMP variant where the party list vote ultimately determines the partisan distribution in parliament. The contamination thesis maintains that parties will contest SMD contests even if they have no chance of winning because they can lift their party list vote. This incentive may help to explain the presence of parties beyond a district's “carrying capacity”. In a single member district, there should be no more than two viable competitors (Cox 1997). Popular or well known candidates may be able to lift their party's vote which could help the party secure more seats than it would otherwise have. Parties with poor candidates, on the other hand, have the potential to damage the party.

In the aggregate analysis, there is some evidence to suggest that the presence of candidates helps to increase the party list vote. There is also evidence to suggest that the party list vote is higher in districts with incumbents. On the other hand, the presence of a list MP in a district appears to make no difference. The individual level analysis partly confirms these findings. Voters evaluations of incumbents and party leaders are more positive than those who are perhaps lesser known. In terms of voting, incumbency and party leadership also appears to have some influence. That party leadership would make a difference for the party is not terribly

surprising given that they are the spokespersons of the party. Nor does it seem unreasonable that incumbents should have a potential influence. Voters in New Zealand also appear to more willing to split their votes than voters in other MMP systems, such as Germany. In the 2005 election, 29 percent split their votes. In Germany, the proportion is closer to 20 percent (Pappi and Thurner 2002). Surveys of voters suggest that this is not the result of confusion but rather sophisticated behavior (Karp 2006). The results in this paper also suggest that voters are slightly more likely to cast a straight vote when there is an incumbent or party leader in the district.

The overall impact though is quite small. A substantial proportion of the electorate, when asked to evaluate candidates, simply had no opinion. This reflects the fact that parties rather than candidates appear to matter more in New Zealand politics even though districts are relatively small and MPs are likely to invest a great deal of effort in constituency service. Moreover, New Zealand's previous experience under FPP would suggest a greater potential for candidate effects than in other systems where party lists are used. The limited findings in this context suggest that fears of contamination in other mixed systems might be over stated.

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
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Table 1: Number of Electorates Contested by Party

	1999		2002		2005	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Labour	100.0	(67)	100.0	(69)	100.0	(69)
National	97.0	(65)	100.0	(69)	89.9	(62)
New Zealand First	100.0	(67)	34.8	(24)	58.0	(40)
Act	91.0	(61)	81.2	(56)	81.2	(56)
Greens	74.6	(50)	82.6	(57)	75.4	(52)
Alliance	98.5	(66)	88.4	(61)	4.3	(3)
Progressive Coalition	75.4	(52)	75.4	(52)
United	1.5	(1)	1.4	(1)	89.9	(62)

Source: Chief Electoral Office

Figure 1: Relationship between Candidate and Party Votes



Source: 2005 New Zealand Election, Chief Electoral Office

Table 2: Spillover Effects on the Party Vote: OLS Coefficients

	National		Labour		NZ First		Green		Act		United		Progressive Coal.	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	-1.66	(1.44)	-2.51	(1.70)	.74 *	(0.31)	-1.31 *	(0.61)	-.01	(0.10)	-.43	(0.23)	-.09	(0.09)
Party vote t_{-1}	1.41 **	(0.11)	1.03 **	(0.04)	.42 **	(0.03)	.67 **	(0.07)	.19 **	(0.02)	.39 **	(0.05)	.58 **	(0.05)
Contesting Electorate	11.30 **	(2.27)			.71 **	(0.23)	2.08 **	(0.46)	.24	(0.13)	.50	(0.30)	.27 **	(0.07)
Incumbent	3.75 **	(1.22)	1.73 *	(0.81)										
List MP	-4.05	(2.17)	-1.04	(2.56)	-.07	(0.41)	2.02	(1.95)	-.25	(0.19)	.25	(0.25)	-.01	(0.23)
Repeat candidate	1.09	(1.26)	-.03	(0.94)	.52	(0.38)	.21	(1.52)	.00	(0.12)	.06	(0.18)	.04	(0.09)
Female candidate	-.82	(1.08)	.22	(0.63)	-.43	(0.44)	.14	(0.44)	.01	(0.11)	-.01	(0.15)	.03	(0.07)
Leader	-13.52 **	(4.04)	1.27	(2.50)	2.51 **	(0.91)	-1.99	(1.90)	-.47	(0.40)	.41	(0.60)	2.31 **	(0.35)
Adj R^2	.94		.94		.86		.70		.82		.77		.92	
n	69		69		69		69		69		69		69	

Source: 2005 New Zealand Election, Chief Electoral Office

**p<.01;*p<.05

Table 3: Sticking with the Candidate Vote: OLS Coefficients

	National		Labour		NZ First		Green		Act		United		Progressive Coal.	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	84.98 **	(3.25)	72.58	(2.78)	53.86 **	(3.40)	26.68 **	(2.46)	19.66 **	(2.04)	37.65 **	(3.96)	21.61 **	(3.10)
Party vote t_{-1}	-.01	(0.16)	.32	(0.07)	.66 *	(0.32)	.94 **	(0.34)	.69 **	(0.26)	.60	(0.58)	1.48	(1.72)
Incumbent	-4.77 **	(1.77)	-7.84	(1.33)										
List MP	-6.58 *	(3.16)	6.55	(4.18)	-2.79	(3.44)	-6.89	(8.41)	-10.56 **	(2.98)	1.47	(2.62)	32.07 **	(7.31)
Repeat candidate	1.53	(1.83)	.23	(1.53)	-5.67	(3.33)	1.44	(6.49)	1.51	(1.79)	-5.49 **	(1.93)	1.62	(2.84)
Female candidate	2.29	(1.57)	.08	(1.03)	-1.96	(3.72)	-1.59	(1.90)	2.06	(1.73)	1.86	(1.57)	1.00	(2.16)
Leader	2.93	(5.87)	-4.58	(4.09)	-37.06 **	(8.17)	-3.60	(8.15)	-18.26 **	(6.27)	-33.56 **	(6.45)	55.15 **	(11.27)
Adj R^2	.15		.37		.32		.07		.31		.38		.64	
n	62		69		40		52		56		61		52	

Source: 2005 New Zealand Election, Chief Electoral Office

**p<.01;*p<.05

Table 4: Candidate Evaluations: OLS Coefficients

	Labour		National		NZ First		Act		Alliance	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	4.90 **	(.25)	4.96 **	(.25)	4.79 **	(.47)	4.46 **	(.29)	4.27 **	(.28)
Incumbent	.28 **	(.10)	.11	(.10)						
List MP	-.05	(.21)	-.11	(.15)	-.11	(.17)	-.13	(.17)	-.06	(.29)
Repeat candidate	.14	(.18)	.26	(.14)	.48 *	(.19)	-.35 *	(.14)	.02	(.29)
Female candidate	.03	(.10)	-.02	(.13)	-.32	(.27)	.20	(.15)	.04	(.11)
Leader	1.07 *	(.48)	.87 **	(.38)	1.18 **	(.41)	2.32 **	(.41)	.99 *	(.43)
Close to party	1.18 **	(.14)	.92 **	(.18)	1.79 **	(.48)	2.27 **	(.41)	4.06 **	(1.03)
Age	.01 **	(.00)	.00	(.00)	.00	(.01)	-.02 **	(.00)	-.01 **	(.00)
Female	.38 **	(.09)	.16	(.09)	.33 *	(.17)	.22 *	(.11)	.45 **	(.10)
Maori	1.12 **	(.16)	-1.04 **	(.17)	-.12	(.26)	-1.00 **	(.18)	.12	(.17)
Education	-.07 *	(.03)	-.03	(.03)	-.24 **	(.05)	.00	(.03)	.00	(.03)
Adj R^2	.05		.02		.06		.06		.03	
n	3694		3544		880		1882		1934	

Source: 2002 New Zealand Election Study (NZES)

**p<.01; *p<.05

Table 5: Party Vote Choice: Logit Coefficients

	Labour		National		NZ First		Green		Act	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Incumbent	.17 **	(.06)	.00	(.08)						
Contesting Electorate					-.11	(.20)	-.60 **	(.18)	.06	(.16)
List MP	.18	(.13)	-.16	(.13)	.25	(.18)	.26	(.19)	-.16	(.25)
Repeat candidate	.00	(.12)	-.05	(.12)	.25	(.19)	.21	(.17)	-.45 *	(.19)
Female candidate	-.04	(.06)	-.24 *	(.11)	-.37	(.31)	.03	(.15)	-.26	(.22)
Leader	.45	(.30)	1.14 **	(.25)	.16	(.47)	.68	(.45)	.90	(.47)
Close to party	1.51 **	(.11)	1.50 **	(.13)	3.30 **	(.22)	3.30 **	(.21)	3.88 **	(.29)
Age	.01 **	(.00)	.00	(.00)	.02 **	(.00)	-.03 **	(.00)	-.01 **	(.00)
Female	.23 **	(.06)	.11	(.08)	-.13	(.10)	.04	(.12)	-.69 **	(.13)
Maori	.47 **	(.10)	-1.62 **	(.23)	.24	(.17)	.43 *	(.20)	-1.67 **	(.46)
Education	-.04 *	(.02)	.00	(.02)	-.20 **	(.03)	.23 **	(.04)	.15 **	(.04)
Constant	-1.05 **	(.16)	-1.68 **	(.20)	-2.60 **	(.28)	-2.28 **	(.33)	-2.47 **	(.34)
Nagelkerke R^2	.09		.08		.17		.19		.17	
n	5026		5026		5026		5026		5026	

Source: 2002 New Zealand Election Study (NZES)

**p<.01; *p<.05

Table 6: Likelihood of Sticking with the Candidate's Party: Logit Coefficients

	Labour		National		NZ First		Green		Act	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Incumbent	.20 **	(.07)	-.01	(.09)						
List MP	.22	(.14)	-.14	(.14)	.44	(.30)	.47	(.29)	-.52	(.69)
Repeat candidate	.06	(.12)	.00	(.13)	.43	(.33)	.42	(.27)	-.36	(.43)
Female candidate	-.03	(.07)	-.28 *	(.12)	-.44	(.55)	.00	(.25)	-.28	(.55)
Leader	.63 *	(.30)	1.37 **	(.26)	.33	(.79)	1.17 *	(.54)	2.67 **	(.86)
Close to party	1.15 **	(.09)	1.26 **	(.14)	2.28 **	(.39)	2.72 **	(.27)	3.47 **	(.38)
Age	.01 **	(.00)	.01 *	(.00)	.02 **	(.01)	-.04 *	(.01)	-.03 *	(.01)
Female	.19 **	(.06)	.14	(.08)	-.29	(.29)	.03	(.22)	-.30	(.32)
Maori	.35 **	(.10)	-2.06 **	(.32)	-.35	(.42)	-.48	(.40)	-16.36	(1935.65)
Education	-.07 **	(.02)	.01	(.03)	-.32 **	(.11)	.12	(.06)	.01	(.09)
Constant	-1.46 **	(.16)	-2.19 **	(.22)	-3.84 **	(.83)	-2.99 **	(.54)	-3.29 **	(.80)
Nagelkerke R^2	.07		.08		.14		.17		.20	
n	5291		5065		1765		4192		4134	

Source: 2002 New Zealand Election Study (NZES)

**p<.01; *p<.05