

What Happened at the 2002 Election?

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ABSTRACT

After 2002, the year of the third MMP election in New Zealand, this paper asks whether we may be through the process of electoral system transition and may now simply treat the various electoral outcomes as 'normal' responses to the economic and political events of the government's term of office. Despite high levels of split voting, there is little evidence that voters misunderstood what they were doing. Voters' perceptions of party placings in ideological space indicated considerable continuity, albeit with some changes. However, the party system remained highly dealigned, with vote stability, turnout, party identification, and class voting all in decline already at historically low levels. The dominant party, Labour, has the weakest roots in social structure, and has redeveloped a more middle class social base reminiscent of its support profile in the late 1980s. New Zealand First shows signs of consolidation as a more explicit populist party of the right. United Future has successfully mobilised the non-traditional Christian vote and reasserted the importance of religion as a social cleavage in New Zealand politics. If the 2002 was a 'normal' election, it was one like no other in New Zealand political history.

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Peter Aimer and Jack Vowles

Until 1996, first-past-the-post two-party politics profoundly shaped New Zealand culture and political behaviour. It had done so for as long as most electors could remember. The advent of MMP was a radical change, and it had big effects on the country's political institutions. Since the first MMP election political scientists, political commentators, and politicians themselves have analysed New Zealand elections partly through the lens of electoral system change. 'Adaptation' and 'transition' have been key concepts in much of the analysis. At first it was reasonable to assume that electoral politics were in a state of transition from plurality to proportional elections. Both voters and politicians needed to learn what the new rules were and even more importantly, how to work effectively within those rules. Accordingly, some assumed that there was an interim quality in the election results. They might indicate the shape of the future party system, and influence the sorts and styles of governments likely under MMP, but equally things might be different after MMP had 'bedded in'. But how long do transitions take? There is no theoretical answer, which instead must be one based on more intuitive judgement – or, perhaps, more hindsight than is currently possible. Nevertheless after 2002, the year of the third MMP election, it is time to ask whether we may be through the process of transition and may now simply treat the various electoral outcomes as 'normal' responses to the economic and political events of the government's term of office.

To make the point more clearly, was National's result dismal in 2002 because the transition to MMP was still under way? Was the collapse of the Alliance just a transitional phenomenon? Or, if it was, did it mark the end for a grouping of small parties whose working together under one organisation only made sense under the old FPP electoral system? If so, one part of the transition can be said to have been completed. But these prominent outcomes of the election could equally be evidence of parties still struggling to accommodate to the new electoral environment. Did National voters make a terrible mistake because they did not yet understand how MMP works? Did National fail to campaign effectively for the party vote because its candidates and activists had not yet fully adjusted to the new context of campaigning? Was the collapse of the Alliance because its political leaders had not learned enough skills to manage the demands of coalition politics? Both cases might indicate imperfect adaptation to MMP. Equally though, National's slump could be a fair reflection of the party's manifold difficulties when cast into opposition for the first time in nearly a decade. Would its problems not have been similar had the 1999 election been fought under FPP? Similarly the Alliance's demise could be seen as the predictable consequence of bitter internal ideological and strategic differences.

One strand of theory provides some helpful insights. Its focus is on political stability. The development of more predictable and stable patterns of political behaviour in the aftermath of change might be one sign that New Zealanders are adjusting to MMP. Political scientists in the United States and Europe have developed the concept of

voter alignment to a party system (Key 1955; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; for a New Zealand application see Vowles 1997). A well-aligned party system is assumed to be stable: that is, based on a relatively large proportion of voters choosing the same party from one election to the next. This stability will be anchored in various ways: by high turnout, which is based on voter commitment to the system, and on the ability of political parties to mobilise the vote. Stability will also be anchored in high levels of party identification. That is, voters will feel an emotional attachment and/or a cognitive commitment to a particular political party. Such attachments and commitments will be in many cases inherited from voters' parents. And such behaviour and attachments will also be underpinned in the social structure: that is, the party system will be shaped by the social cleavages that express differences within a country. Such differences may be rooted in occupational class, religion, ethnicity, and/or region.

New Zealand developed a two-party system in the 1930s and 1940s closely aligned to a cleavage based on occupational class. But since the 1960s, if not earlier, the New Zealand party system has been 'dealigning'. Vote stability hit a high point in 1949 and 1951, but by the 1990s volatility had reached levels close to those before the party system's last 'realignment' in 1935 and 1938 (Vowles & Aimer, 1993:14; Vowles et al, 1995:43-5; Vowles 2003). During the 1950s the National-Labour dominance of the 1940s was already being eaten away primarily by the Social Credit party (now the Democrats). Later came the Values Party (precursor to the Greens. In the 1990s, came NewLabour, the Alliance, and New Zealand First. Of these, the Alliance was a coalition containing NewLabour, the Democrats, and the Green party (and also Maori party Mana Motuhake, and the Liberal party). By the 1993 election the vote for the traditional two parties was down to just under 70 per cent, but National and Labour still retained all but 4 of the 99 seats in Parliament. Of those seats, the Alliance and New Zealand First captured two each.

Under FPP dealignment among voters was not reflected in the election of MPs. In terms of seats held in Parliament, there appeared little or no evidence of voter movements away from the two major parties. One of the first effects of MMP was a reshaping of the party system and realignment at the parliamentary level. Once the 1993 referendum had confirmed the shift to MMP, new parties, some obviously ephemeral (ROC, Conservative, Future New Zealand), were formed seeking to occupy niches in the left-right spectrum, or to speak for specific sections of the electorate. ACT stood on the economic right, United in the centre, and the Christian Coalition and Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis took less easily defined positions. The Greens later separated from the Alliance before the 1999 election. This was a clear case of institutional adaptation. As expected, the transition to MMP prompted an increase in the number of effective parties arrayed from left to right (Vowles 1998; Boston et al, 1996). Since the adoption of MMP there has been speculation over the number of viable parties to be expected under proportionality, given the underlying structure of cleavages in New Zealand and the relatively high 5 per cent electoral threshold. (Nagel, 1994; Aimer, 2001). The answer now seems to be that while the electoral fortunes of

individual parties vary from election to election, the basic number of significant players either in parliament or on the brink of representation is seven.

FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE

Where politicians and political observers place the political parties in ‘ideological space’ is reflected among voters. Figure 1 shows how respondents to the New Zealand Election Study in 2002 placed themselves and the parties on the traditional left-right scale (see www.nes.org for details of the sample and survey design). The very close resemblance between the ordering and scoring of these placements and those given in 1999 suggests perceptions of a fairly settled multi-party format, rather than one still in transition. But perceptions of some parties have shifted. On a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right), the mean location in 2002 for respondents’ self-placement was 5.2, almost exactly the same as in 1999. The Greens are now seen as the party most to the left at 2.44 (in 1999 2.7). United Future (not assessed in 1999) takes the position closest to the centre. New Zealand First moved to the right to 6.55 (in 1999 5.7); National closer to the centre 7.07 (formerly 7.5). For the time being, at least, in the eyes of most electors, Peter Dunne’s party is the ‘centre’ party in NZ politics, closest to the mean for all respondents, having displaced New Zealand First. This is exactly where Dunne has wanted to be since the adoption of MMP and his departure from Labour in 1994. Meanwhile, as in 1999, Labour still occupies a position closer than National to the median voter, and along with its coalition partner (Progressive Coalition) and parliamentary support party (United Future) comprises a ‘closed’ governing combination, which would meet the approval of coalition theorists.

TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE

But Labour’s governing position is not the gift of an MMP election. Table 1 (column 4) displays the responses to a question asking people how they would have voted if the 2002 election had been held under FPP. It confirms that Labour would have swept back to power dramatically had the election been held under FPP rules. The table also confirms the expected effect of MMP in redistributing the vote more widely across the political spectrum than under FPP, in particular towards small parties (compare columns 2 and 4). Those small parties would have had little or no chance of winning seats in electorate-by-electorate FPP contests. In a hypothetical FPP election in 2002 their combined vote would have been almost halved (a comparable finding to that in 1999). On the other hand, Labour’s and, even more so, National’s votes would have benefited under FPP. National’s electorate and hypothetical FPP vote were both substantially greater than its MMP party vote. Yet any suspicion among National partisans that they were ‘robbed’ by the electoral system due to voters’ confusion about the effect of the party and electorate votes ought to be dispelled by the last three columns. These show that National’s party vote under MMP was a true reflection of how much it was liked by voters. The proportion who ‘most liked’ National and who also gave both their party vote and hypothetical FPP vote to National were consistent with and close to National’s actual party vote. Column six indicates the proportions of voters who both most liked the party in question and

who cast their vote for that party. 85 per cent of voters cast ‘sincere’ votes for the party they most liked. Column 7 indicates the proportions who most liked the party in question and would have cast their vote for it under FPP. A hypothetical FPP election might have brought more votes National’s way. But assuming that the competing centre and centre-right parties had been contesting such an FPP election as they did under MMP, column 7 suggests that National’s FPP advantage would have been based on strategic voters whose real likings were for other parties. Under the hypothetical FPP election, another 10 per cent of voters would have been ‘strategic’ rather than ‘sincere’ voters.

Together, the wider effective choice of parties that voters have under MMP and so the greater opportunity for sincere voting - voting for a ‘most liked’ party - provide a theoretical argument for lower rates of electoral volatility under MMP than FPP, on average. Yet electoral volatility rates have remained high through the three MMP elections. Some of this may be attributed to the appearance of new parties in response to MMP, and is therefore a transitional phenomenon. But much is of political origin, the results of people’s reactions the cut and thrust of party politics and their judgements of the performance of the government and the opposition, the parties and their leaders. The trend toward volatility is also in keeping with the experience of other mature democracies, regardless of their electoral systems (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000, 40-41). For example, volatility rates have tended to rise over the long-term in the PR-based stable Scandinavian party systems, where levels of 20-40 per cent are now normal. High rates of volatility are therefore as much to be expected under MMP as FPP, and are not necessarily an indicator of an incomplete transition from FPP to proportionality. Nor are they an indigenous phenomenon. But sustained volatility does indicate that the parliamentary realignment forged by MMP was primarily a function of institutional change, and implied no equivalent realignment among voters. In the polling booths across New Zealand, a situation of dealignment still prevailed.

TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE

Table 2 provides the detail. It charts the various inter-party flows of the vote from 1999 to 2002. The shaded cells contain voters who made the same party choices in both elections. They total 40 per cent (bottom figure in each cell) of electors so qualified, to which we might add another 10 per cent who abstained from voting both times. In other words, virtually half the electors who were eligible to do so either chose a different party in 2002 from the one they had chosen in 1999 or they did not vote at all in 2002. The central figure in each cell indicates where each party’s 1999 voters went to in 2002. The figure in the shaded cells measures the loyalty rate for each party, that is, the proportion of its 1999 voters who stayed loyal in 2002. National’s collapse is measured by the fact that fewer than half those who voted for it in 1999 did so again in 2002, compared to a loyalty rate of 60 per cent among Labour voters. Simply because of National’s electoral size, the slump in its party vote was the single largest source of volatility in 2002, accounting for 13.4 per cent of the panel sample, though 1999 Labour voters were not far behind (12.4 per cent). In Labour’s

case, setbacks during the campaign were probably responsible, something possible under any electoral system. But as indicated in table 1, a significant part of the flows from National might not have happened under FPP. MMP, far from encouraging stability, may be encouraging greater volatility.

Typically, the electoral patterns underlying volatility are diverse. Those switching their vote away from their previous choice went in all directions, though the largest clusters usually favoured parties ideologically closest to their former choice. Thus Labour benefited handsomely from the collapse of the Alliance, while National and ACT exchanged voters in almost equal numbers. Significant exchanges also took place between Labour and the Greens, with the Greens doing marginally the better in 2002. National lost the largest share of its switchers to Labour, with significant proportions also going into non-vote and to New Zealand First and United Future. But the recovery of New Zealand First owed to both former National and Labour voters in almost equal proportions. The eclectic partisan sources of New Zealand First's 2002 constituency are indicated in the row percentages. Only a little more than one quarter of its 2002 voters stood behind New Zealand First in 1999, revealing the selective appeal of this idiosyncratic party. The same can be said for United Future.

The two-vote provision under MMP enables electors to give their party vote to one party, while choosing the candidate of a different party in their own electorate, a practice described as 'split voting'. All three MMP elections have seen surprisingly high but consistent rates of split voting – 37 per cent in 1996, 35 per cent in 1999, and 39 per cent in 2002. Split voting may occur for a number of reasons (Banducci, Karp and Vowles 1998; Karp, Vowles, Banducci and Donovan 2002). One pattern has emerged strongly in all three MMP elections. It indicates an appreciation among voters who support small parties that such parties' candidates are rarely in a strong enough competitive position to win electorate contests under FPP rules. The exceptions in 1996-2002 were the leaders of Alliance/Progressive Coalition, New Zealand First, United Future, and the Greens' co-leader. Under MMP, the various electorates where FPP rules apply are still above all battlegrounds for the candidates of the biggest parties, Labour and National. Labour and National partisans accordingly have less reason to split their votes.

TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE

Thus as Table 3 shows, nearly 80 per cent of electors who gave their party vote to either Labour or National also voted for a Labour or National candidate. The reverse is not true, however. A mark of the National party's downfall in the election is evident in the shaded National cell, where the middle figure indicates that barely more than half of those who voted for a National candidate also gave their party vote to National. Under MMP it seems that a political party is perceived to be different from, and certainly not greater than, the sum of its parts. By comparison with Labour and National party voters, electors choosing one of the smaller parties were far less inclined to support the party's electorate candidate – if there was one. In every case, with the one exception of Christian Heritage party voters, only quite small minorities

(the top figures in each party row) were ‘straight’ voters, supporting both the party and the party’s candidate. Among the majority of split voters, ideological kinship appears to provide the most powerful steer. Thus 41 per cent of Green party voters also voted for a Labour candidate, more than half of ACT’s party supporters preferred a National candidate, and majorities of Alliance and Progressive Coalition voters chose Labour candidates. But electors choosing the more centre parties, New Zealand First and United, voted in more equal proportions for National and Labour candidates.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Could the frequency of split voting be a contributing factor in maintaining high rates of electoral volatility? If split voting is understood as voting in effect for more than one party, it might conceivably gnaw away at the strength of psychological bonds between voters and parties. If, on the other hand, it reflects the taking-up of an option to cast a relatively non-partisan personal vote, then it may have no such effect. But the speculation that MMP might ‘foster stronger [party] identifications’ (Vowles et al 2002:91), because the wider choice of parties would enable ‘a larger number of voters to feel “close” to one or another of the parties’, shows no obvious sign of coming to fruition. On the contrary, table 4 shows smaller parties show only a very weak tendency to take root in the minds of electors.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, the 2002 election maintained a trend since 1996 of declining identifications. The incidence and strength of party identification, however, probably responds to political events more than systemic influences, such as the nature of the electoral system. National’s electoral collapse is faithfully mirrored in the second and fourth columns of Table 4, which show the proportion of National identifiers steadily declining by 5 per cent between 1999 and 2002. The Alliance’s demise is also starkly revealed. The failure of the new parties to establish consistent cores of identifiers does not indicate the development of a stable post-MMP party system, although the trend for Mew Zealand First is consistently upward. If 2002 is to be counted as a ‘normal’ or ‘post-transition’ election, it can only be on the basis that high volatility is now the norm of New Zealand politics

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

Meanwhile Figure 3 shows that there was no compensating strengthening of the link between social structure and voting. Instead, ‘the somewhat unsteady recovery’ of class voting since 1990 collapsed (Vowles et al 2002:92). In 2002, class voting fell back to its previous lowest level.¹ Combined with the evidence of sagging party identifications, the slump in the level of structural alignments identifies the 2002 election as the most dealigned election since the early 1930s. The factors that might be expected to stabilise individual party preferences are weak at best. This confirms that a continued high rate of electoral volatility is to be expected as normal, not

transitional, features of MMP elections. The rate will vary according to the nature of political controversies and party fortunes in the lead-up to the election.²

Notwithstanding the extent of dealignment, there are shades of distinction between the supporters of the different parties, reflecting in most cases social characteristics associated with the traditional left-right divide in New Zealand politics. The selective appeal of different parties ensures that no party's voters present aggregate profiles that exactly mirror the nation's electors. Figures 4A-F indicate the percentage voting for each party by age, on a base of the enrolled electorate. Thus Labour's vote on this basis was just over 30 per cent, indicated by the horizontal line. Labour got less than its average level of support among those below their low 40s, but more than its average over that age. The New Zealand First profile was similar. The Greens were the only party for which the proportion of young voters were higher than its average level of support. For the other parties, age differences were too small to be statistically significant (see Appendix Table 1). The biggest share of young voters went to non-vote.

FIGURES 4A-F ABOUT HERE

Among Labour's voters, compared to all other voters and nonvoters, there were more women, middle-aged and elderly electors, people with university degrees, people from manual worker and/or union households, Pacific Islanders, and people with no religion, and less rural-dwellers, self-employed and people belonging to non-traditional Christian churches. Labour continued to dominate the party vote among those enrolled in the Maori electorates (53.7 per cent, down only slightly from 55.1 per cent in 1999). Overall, though, controlling for socio-economic variables, somewhat surprisingly Maori were no more likely to vote Labour than anyone else (see Appendix Table 2). Labour's support had weakest roots in social structure. The party has redeveloped a more middle class social base reminiscent of its support profile in the late 1980s, more evidence of the success of Labour's obvious strategy to attract the political centre. National by comparison retained its traditional appeal to the self-employed and rural dwellers. Its voters were somewhat whiter, slightly more self-sufficient in terms of benefits, and held more to traditional Christian beliefs. They were less often likely to rent their house than electors generally, or to be in manual and/or union households.

ACT's voters remained distinctly male, white, middle-class, moderately educated with a significant presence in rural locations. They were less likely to receive benefits, and most concentrated in the northern North Island. They also tended slightly toward the traditional Churches. New Zealand First still held a substantial appeal to Maori voters, over and above socio-economic influences. They remained the second party to Labour in the party votes cast in the Maori electorates (up somewhat from 13.2 per cent to 14.9 per cent). New Zealand First's constituency in 2002 was also distinct for under-representing the university educated, those on benefits, and over-representing people in manual (but not union) households, the elderly, and people in the northern North Island. Green voters, by contrast, who tended to be more educated and young,

were also inclined to have no religion, slightly more likely to be non-traditional rather than traditional Christians, but most likely of all to be of a non-Christian persuasion. They were also the most likely to refuse to declare their religious views. Unnoticed by most commentators, the Greens more than doubled their party vote in the Maori electorates from 5 to 10.9 per cent, but controlling for other socio-economic variables overall Maori were as likely to vote Green as do anything else. United Future's voters, to the extent that they stood out at all from the norm, tended to be middle class, but above all adherents of the less traditional forms of Christianity. United Future's successful mobilisation of the non-traditional Christian vote has reasserted the importance of religion as a social cleavage in New Zealand politics.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Comparative studies of electoral systems created an expectation that electoral participation rates - turnout - might increase under MMP (Vowles et al 2002:99). On cue, turnout did rise in 1996, only to fall back again in 1999 to levels close to those of the last two FPP elections, and consistent with long-term trends of decline both in the valid vote shares and among age-eligible electors. Table 5 shows that in 2002 turnout again slumped, not only perpetuating the trend, but driving the participation rate to its lowest level ever. If the argument that proportional representation would enhance turnout was subject to the usual caveat 'other things being equal', clearly in 2002 they were not. The political reasons for the decline in turnout have still to be determined, but there is one clue in Table 2. Nearly one in five of those who voted Labour in 1999 lapsed into abstention in 2002. This is by far the largest single group of electors among those who made different choices in 2002 than 1999, accounting for 6 per cent of the panel sample, and outnumbering Labour's recruits either from non-voting in 1999, or from the legions of disgruntled National 1999 voters. Though there is always more than one winner in a multi-party election, in an election which Labour was the main winner it still lost a greater proportion of its 1999 vote to non-voting than National. Could this have been averted? As Table 5 also shows, the parties' ability to stem such outflows of indifferent let alone more profoundly disgruntled voters may be increasingly limited by the continued decline of party membership. Assuming that the number of willing party activists has also declined in parallel with the membership totals, the intensity of door-to-door canvassing during the campaign is likely to be decreasing, and the physical mobilisation of potential voters to the polls to be less strenuous.

Conclusion

There is scope for some incredulity at the unexpected scale of National's defeat. The electoral demise of the Alliance after a decade of varied successes as the cornerstone of the political left was expected in the immediate circumstances, and could be interpreted as a sign of adjustment to MMP. Labour's campaign fall was steeper than most expected, but it was not deeply disappointed with the outcome. Even taking into account the 11th-hour breakthrough of United Future, and perhaps even New Zealand First's recovery, the 2002 election did not produce cataclysmic results. There was no talk of a landslide election, as there would have been in the days of FPP. The resulting

instabilities among voters were somewhat greater than those of past experience. There were not huge when one thinks of the surges to Social Credit in 1978 and 1981, the aggressive intrusion of the New Zealand party in 1984, Labour's trouncing in 1990, National's 12 per cent plunge in 1993. But turnover in Parliament was higher in 2002 than 1993. Indeed, turnover of MPs does appear consistently higher under MMP, on average, than under FPP, even taking into account higher levels of voter volatility that may themselves be encouraged by the new system (Vowles 2004). This is consistent with recent international evidence: list systems appear to enhance parliamentary turnover (Studlar and Matland 2003).

Nonetheless, 2002 was a traumatic election for some actors, and for National and United Future it produced a dramatic and for some people a bewildering outcome. The new party line-up in parliament was different in a number of notable ways from that of 1999. It remains a matter of debate whether or not the differences mark part of a progression from one electoral system to another. Continuities and consistencies within the data presented above suggest that the transition phase of electoral politics that began in 1994 may have been largely over by 2002. Perhaps the 2002 election was just a 'normal' MMP election or, at least, marks an important move toward normality. This implies that both voters and politicians have now learnt the rules of MMP, and how they work in practice. But has the experience so far been enough?

To put a contrary view, more experience may be needed before things can be 'normal' under MMP. The trend in 1999 appeared to be in the direction of a partial reversion to two-party politics or, at least, the consolidation of a 'two bloc' system'. In 1996 the two-party vote fell to 62 per cent. In 1999, it was back up to nearly 70 per cent. 2002 was a move back to a more fragmented multi-party system, and with United Future presenting the prospect of a centre 'pivotal' party. It may, in future, stand between the two blocs of the left and right and mediate between them. This indicates a party system rather like that of West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, with United Future positioned like the Free Democrats, ready to go into coalition with either right or left. This means that United Future may determine the shape of future governments, rather than the voters' more directly. United Future may be more suited to this position than New Zealand First, which failed in that role after 1996, and is now moved perceived more widely on the right.

On the other hand, the fragmentation of the right and consolidation of the left suggests a system more like that of Sweden, where the Social Democrats have been able to normally maintain a dominant position by holding on to 40 per cent or more of the votes. There, too, a centre party has sometimes supported the left, and sometimes formed part of the right, but voter shifts have driven changes of government much more often than not. If United Future consolidates, and the right remains split between National, Act, and New Zealand First, 2002 may have set the form of the post-MMP party system. More likely, though, volatility will persist, and there will be further electoral iterations and more consequent party system variations, and further learning will be needed before any sense of 'normality' is established. After all, United Future may implode, as other small parties in support of government have

tended to do. Of course, United Future is a 'party in support' not a coalition partner, much as the Greens were in 1999-2002. The Greens proved less vulnerable in that role, and so may United Future, although its role is somewhat more formalised than was that of the Greens.

So far, neither of the two post-MMP coalitions in New Zealand have survived to, or over, an election intact. (The Alliance survived until the election formally, but in practice it had split). The lesson may be that single-party minority governments will be the most viable style of government in post-MMP New Zealand. Given the smallness of the Progressive Coalition, and its weakness compared to Labour, the government formed after 2002 is a coalition only on its margin. Can party politics said to be 'normal' when we are still unsure what the dominant form of government is likely to be under MMP? However this debate may be resolved, if normality implies some kind of homecoming that returns us to a more stable, predictable, and fully aligned electoral process, it is more likely that we will never go home again. And if the 2002 was a 'normal' election, equally, it was like no other in New Zealand political history.

NOTES

¹ The index of class voting is the Labour percentage of the manual household vote (including farmers) minus the Labour percentage of the non-manual household vote.

² 'Individual' volatility refers to the percentage of voters who vote for different parties in consecutive elections; 'aggregate' volatility measures the net effect of individual volatility on the parties' shares of the vote. It is always lower than individual volatility, because voters moving in opposite directions cancel each other out.

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Table 1: Seats, Votes, and Hypothetical FPP Vote, 2002 Election

	Seats	Party vote	Electorate Vote	Hypothetic al FPP vote	Party Most Liked	Consistent Party Liked/Party Vote	Consistent Party Liked/FPP Hypothetical
Alliance	0	1.3	1.7	1	1	.8	.3
Green	9	7.0	5.4	5	7	5.6	3.9
Progressive	2	1.7	1.8	1	1	.9	.4
Labour	52	41.3	44.7	47	46	39.4	39.8
United Future	8	6.7	4.6	3	7	5.4	2.6
Christian Heritage	0	1.4	2.1	1	1	.6	.4
New Zealand First	13	10.4	4.0	6	10	8.4	5.1
National	27	20.9	30.5	32	20	18.1	19.9
ACT	9	7.1	3.6	3	7	5.6	2.3
Other	0	2.2	1.6	1	0	.6	0
Total	120	100	100	100	100	85.4	74.7
N				4892	5399		
Combined Left	63	51.3	53.6	54	55		
Centre	21	18.5	10.7	10	18		
Right	36	28	34.1	35	27		

Left: Alliance, Green, Progressive Coalition, Labour

Centre: United Future, Christian Heritage, New Zealand First

Right: National, Act

Figure 1. Respondents' Self-Placements on the Left-Right Scale and the Average Placements of Parties by Respondents




Table 2 Split Voting in 2002: The Party and Electorate Votes

		Electorate Vote									
Party Vote	Row %	Labour	National	Green	NZ First	Act	Alliance	Christian	Progressive	United F	Total %
	Col %										%
	Total %										N
Labour	79.4	6.8	3.9	1.7	1.2	.8	.2	1.6	2.8		41.6
	72.5	9.3	30.0	15.9	14.4	30.0	4.5	50.0	24.9		1961
	33.0	2.8	1.6	.7	.5	.3	.1	.7	1.1		
National	6.9	79.9	1.5	1.7	3.9	.1	1.7		3.5		20.7
	3.1	54.7	5.8	7.9	22.8	2.0	19.3		15.7		978
	1.4	16.6	.3	.4	.8	.0	.4		.7		
Green	41.4	8.9	39.0	2.4	1.5	2.7	.6	.3	1.5		7.1
	6.5	2.1	51.0	3.7	3.0	18.0	2.3	1.6	2.3		336
	2.9	.6	2.8	.2	.1	.2	.0	.0	.1		
NZ F irst	29.8	29.0	3.3	25.9	3.7	1.2	1.2	1.6	2.5		10.3
	6.8	9.9	6.2	58.9	10.8	12.0	6.8	12.9	5.5		486
	3.1	3.0	.3	2.7	.4	.1	.1	.2	.3		
Act	14.5	54.6	1.2	1.8	18.6		.6	.9	5.3		7.2
	2.3	13.0	1.6	2.8	37.7		2.3	4.8	8.3		339
	1.0	3.9	.1	.1	1.3		.0	.1	.4		
Alliance	50.0	11.7	5.0	1.7	5.0	25.0					1.3
	1.4	.5	1.2	.5	1.8	30.0					60
	.6	.1	.1	.0	.1	.3					
Christian	8.6	14.3	2.9	5.7		4.3	62.9		1.4		1.5
	.3	.7	.8	1.9		6.0	50.0		.5		70
	.1	.2	.0	.1		.1	.9		.0		
Progressive	66.7	2.6	1.3	1.3			3.8	17.9	1.3		1.7
	2.4	.1	.4	.5			3.4	22.6	.5		78
	1.1	.0	.0	.0			.1	.3	.0		
United F	24.1	35.3	.6	4.1	2.5		2.8	.9	27.8		6.8
	3.6	7.9	.8	6.1	4.8		10.2	4.8	41.0		320
	1.6	2.4	.0	.3	.2		.2	.1	1.9		
Total %	45.5	30.3	5.4	4.5	3.5	1.1	1.9	1.3	4.6	100.0	
N		2148	1428	257	214	167	50	88	62	217	4716


NOTE: Split voting sums to 40.1%, as compared to 39.3% in the official figures, well within the sample margin of error. The table excludes voters for smaller parties making up 2.2 per cent of the party vote and 1.6 per cent of the electorate vote.

Table 3: Flows of the Party Votes From 1999 to 2002

		1999 Party Vote										
2002 Party Vote	Row %	Nonvote	Labour	National	Alliance	NZ First	Act	Green	CHP	United	FNZ	Total %
Nonvote	44.9 60.2 10.5	26.6 19.7 6.2	12.1 11.5 2.8	3.1 11.4 .7	2.3 16.7 .5	3.5 14.3 .8	1.6 8.3 .4	4.7 38.7 1.1	.4 16.7 .1			100.0 23.5
Labour	12.1 22.0 3.8	59.8 60.0 19.0	13.9 17.8 4.4	8.7 42.9 2.7	1.2 11.1 .4	.9 4.8 .3	2.3 16.7 .7	.3 3.2 .1				100.0 31.7
National	5.1 4.7 .8	9.6 4.9 1.6	68.9 45.4 11.2	2.3 5.7 .4	.6 2.8 .1	7.9 22.2 1.3	2.3 8.3 .4	1.1 6.5 .2	1.7 50.0 .3			100.0 16.2
Green	5.6 1.6 .3	24.1 3.8 1.2	5.6 1.1 .3	9.3 7.1 .5		5.6 4.8 .3	40.7 45.8 2.0					100.0 4.9
NZ First	9.0 4.2 .7	25.8 6.7 2.1	29.2 9.7 2.4	3.4 4.3 .3	27.0 66.7 2.2	2.2 3.2 .2	2.2 4.2 .2			1.1 8.3 .1		100.0 8.2
Act	10.2 3.1 .5	1.7 .3 .1	33.9 7.4 1.8			44.1 41.3 2.4	3.4 4.2 .2					100.0 5.4
Alliance		10.0 .3 .1	10.0 .4 .1	40.0 5.7 .4	10.0 2.8 .1		30.0 6.3 .3					100.0 .9
CHP	7.1 .5 .1	7.1 .3 .1	7.1 .4 .1			7.1 1.6 .1	7.1 2.1 .1	57.1 25.8 .7		7.1 8.3 .1		100.0 1.3
PC		18.8 .9 .3		68.8 15.7 1.0				12.5 6.5 .2				100.0 1.5
United F	3.5 1.0 .2	15.8 2.6 .8	28.1 5.9 1.5	8.8 7.1 .5		3.5 3.2 .2	3.5 4.2 .2	8.8 16.1 .5	3.5 33.3 .2	17.5 83.3 .9		100.0 5.2
		191 17.5	345 31.6	269 24.7	70 6.4	36 3.3	63 5.8	48 4.4	31 2.8	6 .5	12 1.1	1091 100.0

NOTE: Data is from the 1999-2002 panel, weighted to reflect both election results. The table excludes some voters for small parties. People voting for the same party in 2002 as in 1999 were 38 percent of the panel (on a base including nonvoters). Of those who voted in both elections, 48 per cent voted for a different party in 2002 from that they voted for in 1999.

Figure 2. Macro-Level Party Identification Trends in New Zealand, 1975-2002




NOTE: Overall party identification was 55 per cent in 2002, down one point from 1999. But strong or fairly strong identification was down to 36 per cent from a 1999 figure of 41 per cent. This is one point lower than the previous low in 1990.

Table 4. Party Identifications Over Two Election Campaigns, 1999 and 2002

	1999 campaign	1999 post-election	2002n campaign	2002 post-election
None	40.1	44.0	41.4	46.1
Labour	22.7	22.4	28.0	25.5
National	26.0	25.8	21.1	20.5
Green	.8	1.0	3.1	2.4
NZ First	1.3	1.4	1.8	2.2
Act	1.8	1.4	1.1	1.5
Alliance	2.3	2.4	.3	.3
PC	-	-	0	.2
UFNZ	0	0.0	.2	.6
Christian Heritage	1.0	.7	.8	.2
Other	.7	.8	.3	.4
N	2384	5806	2513	5637

Figure 3 Class Voting in New Zealand 1963-2002



Figures 4A-F. Age and Voting for Six Political Parties, 2002 Election









Table 5: Turnout and Party Membership, 1990-2002

	Valid Votes as % of those enrolled	Age-eligible effective turnout	Party membership	Party membership as % adults
1990	82.8	76.0	-	-
1993	82.8	76.7	-	-
1996	85.6	78.4	153,000	5.8
1999	82.3	75.0	132,890	4.8
2002	76.1	72.1	99,426	3.5

The 2002 figure includes allocations of the minimum 500 members for Act, Mana Maori, and Libertarianz. These parties refused to disclose their membership to the Electoral Commission, despite this data being one of the criteria used to allocate funds for campaign party broadcasting. Estimating from party membership data collected in the 2002 NZES, Act membership could have been approximately 8,000, bringing the per cent party members up to 3.8 per cent.

Appendix Table 2A Social Structure, Union Membership, and Region and Vote, 2002

	Labour			National			Green		
	prch	B	SE P{z}	prch	B	SE P{z}	prch	B	SE P{z}
Female	0.06	0.28	0.07 **	-0.01	-0.07	0.09	0.01	0.21	0.14
Age	0.42	0.02	0.00 **	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.06	-0.02	0.01 **
Sector									
Employ self	-0.08	-0.39	0.10 **	0.03	0.26	0.11 *	0.01	0.19	0.19
Public	0.03	0.15	0.09	-0.01	-0.08	0.13	0.00	0.13	0.19
Class									
Manual	0.04	0.19	0.08 *	-0.05	-0.46	0.11 **	0.00	0.05	0.17
Farmer	-0.02	-0.08	0.16	0.03	0.26	0.16	-0.01	-0.27	0.34
Union	0.14	0.60	0.08 **	-0.06	-0.58	0.13 **	0.01	0.25	0.17
Religion									
No religion	0.04	0.17	0.09 *	-0.07	-0.67	0.12 **	0.04	0.94	0.18 **
NonTrad	-0.13	-0.65	0.15 **	-0.09	-1.14	0.23 **	0.02	0.53	0.27 *
NonChristian	0.05	0.21	0.21	-0.07	-0.77	0.32 *	0.16	1.98	0.27 **
Refused	0.02	0.10	0.12	-0.05	-0.51	0.15 **	0.05	0.95	0.23 **
Education									
Low	0.03	0.16	0.08	0.00	-0.04	0.10	-0.02	-0.46	0.18 *
University	0.07	0.31	0.10 **	-0.01	-0.13	0.12	0.01	0.25	0.18
Ethnicity									
Maori	0.00	-0.01	0.14	-0.11	-1.50	0.30 **	0.00	0.04	0.27
Pacific	0.17	0.71	0.24 **	-0.11	-2.08	0.80 *	-0.02	-1.25	0.86
Asian	0.04	0.19	0.23	-0.01	-0.05	0.30			
Benefit	0.02	0.08	0.08	-0.03	-0.28	0.10 *	0.02	0.47	0.15 **
Renter	0.04	0.19	0.11	-0.06	-0.63	0.17 **	-0.01	-0.35	0.23
Region									
North North	-0.04	-0.16	0.08 *	0.00	-0.01	0.11	-0.02	-0.69	0.17 **
South North	-0.02	-0.07	0.09	0.02	0.17	0.11	0.00	-0.08	0.18
Urban									
Rural	-0.07	-0.31	0.11 **	0.06	0.46	0.13 **	0.01	0.33	0.23
City	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.16	0.17
_cons		-2.24	0.16 **		-0.83	0.19 **		-2.62	0.32 **
R Squared	0.05			0.07			0.09		
N	4205			4205			4205		

NOTE: Binomial Logistic regressions of each set of party voters against all others in the sample (mail respondents only). Probability changes are from the minimum to the maximum values of the variables, all of which are 0 or 1, except age. Cox and Snell pseudo-R Squared estimates are reported. Residual variables against which probabilities are estimated are for:

- Sector; private sector workers and those never in the workforce;
- Class; non-manual workers (ie, the middle class);
- Religion; members of traditional Christian Churches;
- Education; those with higher secondary and lower tertiary qualifications;
- Ethnicity; Europeans;
- Region; the South Island;
- Urbanism; country towns and provincial cities.

** significant at or below .01 *significant at or below .05

Appendix Table 2B Social Structure, Union Membership, and Region and Vote, 2002

	NZ First			Act				United		
	prch	B	SE P{z}	prch	B	SE P{z}	prch	B	SE P{z}	
Female	-0.01	-0.17	0.12	-0.02	-0.65	0.14 **	-0.01	-0.27	0.14	
Age	0.18	0.02	0.00 **	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Sector										
Employ self	0.02	0.21	0.14	0.01	0.27	0.17	0.00	-0.07	0.19	
Public	0.00	0.05	0.17	0.00	-0.14	0.21	0.00	0.09	0.19	
Class										
Manual	0.02	0.27	0.13 *	-0.02	-0.47	0.19 *	-0.01	-0.21	0.17	
Farmer	0.00	-0.07	0.24	0.00	0.12	0.27	-0.02	-0.76	0.39 *	
Union	0.00	-0.05	0.16	-0.01	-0.19	0.18	0.00	-0.05	0.18	
Religion										
No religion	-0.01	-0.21	0.16	-0.01	-0.21	0.17	-0.03	-1.06	0.24 **	
NonTrad	-0.03	-0.52	0.25 *	-0.01	-0.24	0.28	0.11	1.44	0.18 **	
NonChristian	-0.02	-0.26	0.45	-0.02	-1.02	0.58	0.02	0.40	0.36	
Refused	-0.01	-0.21	0.21	-0.02	-0.67	0.27 *	-0.02	-0.48	0.28	
Education										
Low	0.02	0.25	0.14	-0.02	-0.54	0.17 **	-0.01	-0.22	0.17	
University	-0.05	-0.88	0.24 **	0.01	0.22	0.17	0.01	0.12	0.19	
Ethnicity										
Maori	0.05	0.57	0.20 **	-0.03	-1.01	0.41 *	-0.02	-0.48	0.29	
Pacific	-0.05	-1.08	0.81	-0.02	-0.89	0.77	-0.01	-0.14	0.46	
Asian	-0.03	-0.62	0.65	-0.02	-0.62	0.50	-0.03	-0.91	0.63	
Benefit	-0.02	-0.28	0.14 *	-0.02	-0.59	0.18 **	0.00	-0.08	0.16	
Renter	0.00	0.01	0.21	0.01	0.27	0.21	-0.02	-0.47	0.25	
Region										
North North	0.04	0.53	0.15 **	0.03	0.71	0.17 **	0.00	-0.03	0.17	
South North	0.02	0.22	0.17	0.01	0.34	0.21	0.00	-0.03	0.19	
Urban										
Rural	0.01	0.12	0.17	0.03	0.64	0.21 **	-0.01	-0.21	0.25	
City	-0.01	-0.14	0.14	0.01	0.21	0.17	0.01	0.23	0.16	
_cons		-3.80	0.29 **		-2.28	0.32 **		-2.50	0.31 **	
R Squared	0.07			0.08			0.08			
N	4205			4205			4205			

NOTE: AS for Table 6A

Appendix Table 1: Social Structure and Voting Choices at the 2002 General Election

	Nonvote	Labour	National	Green	NZ First	Act	Alliance	Christian	PC	United Future	Col %	N
All	23.9	31.4	15.9	5.4	8	5.4	1	1.1	1.3	5.1		5579
Gender												
male	23	29	16	5	9	7	1	1	2	6	48	2691
Female	25	34	16	5	8	4	1	1	1	5	52	3090
Age Groups												
18_24	38	20	14	9	5	6	2	0		4	14	371
25_29	37	27	14	7	3	5	1		1	5	9	344
30_39	28	29	15	7	6	6	1	2	1	4	21	1092
40_49	21	31	15	7	7	6	1	2	2	7	20	1279
50_59	16	37	16	4	10	8	1	1	2	4	15	1134
60 plus	13	40	19	2	14	3	0	1	3	6	21	1562
Ethnicity												
NZ European	22	31	18	6	8	6	1	1	1	6	87	4461
Other European	19	37	9	4	3	5	3	3	4	9	2	69
Asian	23	47	16	2	3	4		1	1	3	2	97
Maori	42	30	3	6	10	1	2	0	1	2	7	660
Pacific	42	45	4	1	1	1		2		4	2	79
Occupation												
Nonmanual	21	33	16	5	7	6	1	1	1	6	62	3503
Worker	28	32	12	6	10	3	0	1	2	5	29	1518
Farmer	25	21	28	4	8	7	1	1	1	3	9	485
Work status												
Selfemployed	21	25	23	5	10	7	0	1	1	5	22	1312
Private WageSal	27	31	15	5	8	6	1	1	1	5	55	2819
State	19	40	12	5	7	4	2	1	2	7	18	1148
Mixed	21	37	12	6	6	4	1	2	2	9	3	209
Benefits												
No Benefit	26	30	18	5	7	6	1	1	1	5	62	2798
Benefit	24	35	14	6	9	3	1	1	2	5	38	2006

	Nonvote	Labour	National	Green	NZFirst	Act	Alliance	Christian	PC	United Future	Col %	N
All	23.9	31.4	15.9	5.4	8	5.4	1	1.1	1.3	5.1		5579
Religion												
No religion	29	31	12	9	6	6	2	0	1	2	26	894
Trad Christian	20	33	20	3	9	6	1	1	2	5	61	2746
Nontrad Christian	34	20	7	5	6	4	1	5	1	15	10	465
NonChristian	22	37	9	17	4	2	0	0	1	7	3	139
Education												
Primary only	27	36	13	2	14	2	0	0	1	3	5	319
Secondary only	26	32	15	4	10	4	1	1	2	5	44	2492
Tertiary	24	29	16	7	7	7	1	1	1	6	31	1621
Degree	17	34	17	8	3	9	2	1	1	7	20	1114
Housing												
Mortgage Free	17	36	18	3	11	5	0	1	2	6	23	1880
Mortgage	21	31	17	5	8	7	1	1	2	6	24	1621
Private Rent	28	32	10	5	6	8	1	1	1	4	7	411
State Rent	40	40	2	3	7	0	3	1	2	2	2	150
Other	36	22	15	11	3	5	2	1	0	3	19	425
Urban-rural												
Rural	23	24	23	6	10	8	0	1	1	3	16	826
Country town	28	33	16	4	9	3	0	1	1	4	11	532
Over 10,000	22	37	13	4	9	5	1	2	0	5	8	362
Over 25,000	25	31	15	5	8	4	2	2	2	5	21	964
Over 100,000	23	33	15	6	7	6	1	1	2	6	45	1961
Region												
North NI	24	31	15	4	10	7	1	1	1	5	44	2485
South NI	25	32	16	5	7	5	1	1	1	5	28	1570
South Island	25	32	18	7	6	4	1	1	2	5	27	1478

NOTE: Ethnicity is defined by primary identification; occupation and work status are defined by male head of household. Ns are unweighted, all other data weighted by age, gender, and vote category.