

Before and After:
Campaign Influences on Voting Choices at the 2002 New Zealand
Election

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ABSTRACT

Using a panel of voters interviewed in rolling cross-sections during the campaign and data collected from those same individuals post-election, this paper establishes the extent of campaign vote choice volatility and tests various potential explanations.

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
Before and After: Campaign Influences on Voting Choices at the 2002 New Zealand Election

The 2002 New Zealand election was called on June 11 2002, four months earlier than required. The Prime Minister announced that it would be held on July 27. Vote intention polling data known at the time seemed that Labour would remain the government after the election, perhaps even with an absolute majority of seats. Most expected Labour's support to fall, but few expected such a steep drop from over 50 per cent in the polls to, at times, below 40 per cent. The election outcome was another minority government. Labour polled 41.3 per cent of the party vote, only a small improvement on the 38.7 per cent of votes it received in 1999. Meanwhile the National party, dominant in New Zealand politics for decades, was decimated. This paper asks: what happened during the campaign to produce these relatively unexpected outcomes?

The Extent of Campaign Change and Key Campaign Events

Since 1996, the New Zealand Election Study has included a sample of people interviewed on a daily basis throughout the campaign. In 2002, as before, the same people were then invited to participate in the post-election survey, forming a panel, or two-wave pre- and post-election study. By the end of the campaign, about 2500 people had provided information about their campaign vote intentions and indicated, after the election, how they actually voted. This data is virtually the best available with which to investigate campaign effects. People are interviewed all the way through the campaign, and then contacted again afterwards.

Figure 1. The Labour-National Battleground, 2002 Election Campaign



NOTE: The first vertical line represents the timing of the English 'paintergate' attack; the second 'cornagate' and the third the United Future 'worm'.

Source: NZES Campaign Wave, 2002

Figure 1 simply shows the trend of campaign voting intentions of all those who responded to our questions during the campaign (about 3,500 people). It focuses on National and Labour. The data is made up of an average of 100 interviews per day

of the campaign (most done in the evening). These are smoothed using a moving average over five days. In other words, the first day's data shown in the figure is June 23, and indicates the vote intentions for the two parties averaged over the days June 21 to 25. The second day's data is averaged from June 22-26, and so on. The five-day averaging centred on the middle day means that where changes are abrupt graphical plots of intention change may appear to anticipate shifts two days before the precipitating event. The final day for which data is presented is July 24, as indicated by a vertical line, although interviews continued until the 26. The other three vertical lines indicate the timing of three key campaign events.

National entered the campaign lower in the polls than at any time since the early 1990s. Remarkably, it stayed on a virtually flat line throughout the campaign. Whatever it did seemed to make little difference. Everywhere else, however, votes were moving. Labour entered the campaign strongly, with stirring political advertising that pushed the right buttons of national pride. It began to campaign for majority government, presumably on the assumption that the trend away from small parties apparent in vote intention polls since 1999 could be exploited. However, the early election had been a gamble. Clark and her government were potentially vulnerable on a number of fronts.

Some years earlier while in Opposition, Clark had been asked to paint a picture for sale to benefit a charity. Having artistic taste but little talent of that kind, and not wanting to produce something of poor quality, she had instead commissioned a painting and signed it. When this information became public, Clark was accused of fraud. She apologised, but ungracefully, claiming that there was precedent for the practice. While most New Zealanders considered the 'paintergate' scandal trivial, a formal complaint was made by a member of the public. The complainant was a former member of the Labour party, currently a member of the United Future party, although that party claimed no responsibility for his action. The complaint sparked a police investigation, still ongoing when Clark announced the election date. On Sunday July 7 Bill English launched a strong attack on her handling of 'paintergate', and quoted selectively from some critical sections of the Police Report on the matter that had just been released. As many predicted, the Report had concluded that there was a case for fraud, but given the circumstances it was too trivial to pursue. Clark threatened libel action against English, and all this received much attention on Sunday night's television news and in the Monday morning newspapers.

The issue of genetic modification (GM) was also dangerous for Labour. Various opinion polls indicated wide public unease about the safety of GM foods, and about the wisdom of the release of GM organisms. The country's 'clean and green' image could be under threat, and, in particular, growing markets for organic food and other products could be at risk. Otherwise a natural Labour ally, the Greens had pledged to withdraw support from a Labour-led government if it lifted an embargo on the commercial planting of genetically modified crops as planned for the end of 2003. The Greens were campaigning strongly on the issue.


On Wednesday July 10 the GM issue exploded. The previous evening Clark had been interviewed by TV3's most prominent news journalist, John Campbell, for delayed airing. Without warning Campbell accused Clark and her government of covering up release and planting of GM corn in New Zealand over the early summer of 2000-01. Clark denied the accusation, but would not answer specific questions in the absence of further briefing on the specifics from the relevant Ministers and officials. Campbell persisted, and the Prime Minister became very frosty, describing Campbell in the aftermath as a 'sanctimonious little creep'. The Prime Minister left

TV3's studios somewhat puzzled, wondering where the accusations were coming from. Campbell was so distressed by the exchange that he had a minor accident in his car on the way home.

The morning after, a book was published making the allegations (Hager 2002). Campbell had been given an advance copy. In campaign mode, the government was not in the easiest position to give an instant response, and journalists made much of the delay. By the end of the day, the government's account of the matter began to provide the details for rebuttal. TV3 still played the 24-hour old Campbell-Clark 'ambush' interview. In the following days it became clear that government scientists and those working for the companies concerned had concluded that the episode had been a false alarm and that initial tests on the seeds had indicated 'false positives'. It was pointed out that at the time some information about the case had been provided both to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification and to the Green party. However the Greens made a statement apparently giving credence to the allegations. The Greens had apparently been told that seeds had been imported, but not that they had been planted. Labour-Green relations, already difficult, became more so.

Figure 2 indicates the trajectory of small party polling during the campaign. After 'corngate' the Greens' polling initially improved, but as the government rebuttal began to draw blood their tide began to fall back as questions were raised about their own handling of the matter. With Labour and Greens falling, other parties would rise, most notably New Zealand First. Act had risen throughout the campaign, but peaked about July 15. From that day onward, it was the turn of the United Future Party.

Figure 2: The Smaller Parties in the 2002 Election Campaign



NOTE: The first vertical line represents the timing of the English 'paintergate' attack; the second 'corngate' and the third the United Future 'worm'.


Source: NZES Campaign Wave, 2002

The final debate among all leaders of parties with representation in the old House took place on July 15. It had an associated panel of a hundred undecided voters with hand-held devices that could be used to measure electronically their positive or negative responses to what the leaders were saying. These appeared in composite as a

‘worm’ that went up or down on viewers’ screens accordingly. This information was not presented during the debate, but later in the evening during the experts’ analysis. It apparently showed a clear victory for United Future leader Peter Dunne, whose party had hitherto been the most insignificant of all during the previous parliamentary term, with public support that rarely reached one per cent and was normally closer to zero. United had, however, had merged with the Christian-based Future New Zealand party, giving Dunne a more effective organisational platform than in the immediate past. Debate effects were significant in the 1996 election (Johnston 1998). There is a *prima facie* case to be tested that something similar happened in 2002.

When asked after the election when they had made up their mind about their party vote, 61 per cent said at some point during the election campaign (Vowles 2003) – the highest figure recorded at any New Zealand Election, and significantly higher than the previous peak in 1996 (52 per cent). 2002 was highly volatile election (Aimer and Vowles 2003) with a volatile campaign. However, despite what respondents reported about the timing of their decision, comparing pre-election intentions with actual votes cast, the 2002 campaign was only about as volatile as the 1999 campaign had been (for comparison see Vowles 2002a, 19). While unexpected, this finding is not a major puzzle. All late deciders do not necessarily change their choices. Shifts were higher at the outset of the campaign in 2002, but flattened out at about 30 per cent somewhat earlier than in 1999. Nonetheless, this is still a high level of volatility. Even in the last week, 20 per cent of voters subsequently changed their minds. A small upward shift in volatility appears to have occurred among those sampled about the time of the Bill English’s attack on Clark over paintergate. Strategically placed almost at mid-campaign, the Campbell interview took place at the outset of a period when campaign choices began to move a little closer to ultimate vote. Whether it was a causal factor remains to be seen.

Figure 3. Percentage of voters whose campaign intention and votes were different, by day of campaign first sampled



NOTE: Includes respondents who did not have a campaign intention when first sampled who voted (that is, shifts from ‘don’t know’ into vote). Excludes persons who did not vote.

SOURCE: 2002 NZES pre- post- panel.

A cross-tabulation of campaign choices prior to the Campbell interview against ultimate vote gives the best indication of the directions of shifts. 25 per cent of people did not vote – a little higher than the actual figure. But only 5 per cent during the campaign would not give a voting choice (after probing). The biggest campaign shift was therefore into nonvoting (not taken account of in Figure 3).

The row percentage figures in the top left of each cell indicate how the non-voters were distributed in terms of their campaign vote choices: nearly half had expressed a Labour intention. Scrutiny of the row figures indicates the sources of United Future voters. Slightly more came from National than Labour, but the difference is well within sampling error. New Zealand First, another campaign winner, took most from Labour.

Table 1: Flow of Vote Intentions into Vote Choices, June 21-July 9 to the Election on July 27

Vote 2002 Election	Campaign Voting Intention										Total N
Row % Col % Total %	DK	Lab- our	Nat- ional	Grn	NZ First	Act	All- iance	CHP	PC	UF	Col%
Nonvote	11.2 51.5 2.8	47.5 24.7 11.9	21.1 21.5 5.3	5.3 19.8 1.3	3.3 14.5 0.8	4.0 19.0 1.0		3.3 76.9 0.8	3.6 45.8 0.9		303 25.0
Labour	2.4 13.6 0.7	87.4 55.9 26.9	4.6 5.7 1.4	2.9 13.6 0.9	1.1 5.8 0.3	0.3 1.6 0.1	0.8 42.9 0.2		0.5 8.3 0.2		373 30.8
National	2.7 7.6 0.4	11.2 3.6 1.7	78.7 49.8 12.2	1.1 2.5 0.2	1.1 2.9 0.2	4.3 12.7 0.7	0.5 14.3 0.1		0.5 4.2 0.1		188 15.5
Green	7.5 6.1 0.3	15.1 1.4 0.7	1.9 0.3 0.1	75.5 49.4 3.3							53 4.4
NZ First	4.7 7.6 0.4	28.0 5.1 2.5	17.8 6.4 1.6	3.7 4.9 0.3	41.1 63.8 3.6	2.8 4.8 0.2			0.9 4.2 0.1	0.9 16.7 0.1	107 8.8
Act		16.7 1.9 0.9	24.2 5.4 1.3	1.5 1.2 0.1	7.6 7.2 0.4	50.0 52.4 2.7			0.0 0.0 0.0		66 5.4
Alliance		33.3 1.0 0.5	11.1 0.7 0.2	22.2 4.9 0.3	5.6 1.4 0.1		16.7 42.9 0.2		11.1 8.3 0.2		18 1.5
Christian	12.5 1.5 0.1	50.0 0.7 0.3						25.0 15.4 0.2		12.5 16.7 0.1	8 0.7
PC	5.6 1.5 0.1	44.4 1.4 0.7	5.6 0.3 0.1		5.6 1.4 0.1			0.0 0.0 0.0	38.9 29.2 0.6		18 1.5
United F	8.6 7.6 0.4	29.3 2.9 1.4	36.2 7.1 1.7	5.2 3.7 0.2	1.7 1.4 0.1	10.3 9.5 0.5		1.7 7.7 0.1		6.9 66.7 0.3	58 4.8
N	66	583	297	81	69	63	7	13	24	6	1212
Row %	5.4	48.1	24.5	6.7	5.7	5.2	0.6	1.1	2	0.5	

One reason for Labour's campaign fall was the failure of many Labour leaners to vote at all. National suffered too, but not as much relative to its vote. The column figures in the middle of each cell indicate campaign losses more clearly. Labour lost almost a quarter of its campaign supporter to nonvote: National a fifth, but that was not much above the average party loss. Otherwise Labour lost most to New Zealand First and next to National. National bled in all directions other than to parties to the left of Labour. The total percentage figures in the bottom right of each cell are the best indicator for relative exchanges between parties. The Greens and Labour exchanged a little under one per cent of all potential voters, going each way. Labour and National exchanged somewhere between 1-2 per cent similarly. But Labour and National both lost more to New Zealand First than they gained. The shaded diagonal cells indicate those people whose first half campaign choice was the same as their vote: New Zealand First and United Future were the most successful parties in retaining those who intended to vote for them before July 10.

General Explanations of Change

Political science and popular explanations of elections both concur in identifying two main sources of changes in voting intentions: perceptions of political leaders, and perceptions of congruence between voter issue opinions and the articulation of party policies. Of the two, most popular attention tends to focus on leader perceptions and, in particular, the politician most preferred as Prime Minister. Helen Clark entered the 2002 election campaign more dominant in New Zealand politics than any politician since Robert Muldoon. Indeed, there is a case to be made that she was already outdoing Muldoon both in terms of her popularity and public perceptions of political competence.

Figure 4: Preferred Prime Minister Over Campaign and Post-Election





Figure 4 shows Clark's popularity falling as the campaign went on, but recovering dramatically post-election. To some extent, this may be an artefact of winning (although survey respondents were asked to indicate what their preference had been on election day). The steepest drop in Clark preferences appears to have taken place over 'corngate.' Contrary to the expectations of many, National leader Bill English

preferences grew over the campaign. Winston Peters ended up about where he began. The 'worm' debate had an obvious effect not only on United Future voting intentions but also on Dunne's personal rating (although this fell back rapidly after the election).

Figure 5 Issue Most Important Personally, 2002 Election Campaign




As for the issues voters found most important personally, as has been common in recent New Zealand election campaigns, health and education were the most important. Education led health for most of the campaign, almost certainly due to the secondary school teachers' industrial action. But it fell away at the end, and health surged ahead post-election. Law and order saw the most variation over the campaign, no doubt due to the strong emphasis placed on it by the Act party, but fell back post-election to a level not much above that at the beginning of the campaign. Tax had the same pattern, but peaked earlier. Environment and economy made the most sustained gains other than health. The GM debate clearly made an impact.

Table 2: Importance of Issues Personally by Party Closest to Views

	Impt Labour	Nat	Green	NZF	Act	Alln	PC	UF	L - N	L-R	
Health	27	38	13	2	6	3	1	1	3	24	20
Education	17	25	26	9	2	5	7	1	2	-1	8
Law/order	11	14	20	2	17	29	1	0	4	-6	-49
Environment	6	10	7	73	1	3	0	0	1	4	73
Economy	5	39	31	0	4	13	0	0	2	8	-9
Tax	5	5	31	1	4	37	1	0	3	-26	-66
Discontent/Pol	3	38	9	4	11	6	2	1	8	29	18
Superannuation	3	60	10	1	13	1	1	1	1	50	37
Unemployment	3	58	13	1	6	1	1	1	4	45	43
Discontent/Soc	2	9	3	2	2	5	3	0	62	6	4
Immigration	2	16	2	0	77	1	0	0	2	14	-64
Maori	2	6	13	4	51	17	0	0	0	-8	-72
Welfare	2	33	7	3	5	14	4	3	14	26	17
Defence	1	18	56	1	9	6	1	0	0	-38	-50

Table 2 lists the main issues named by voters in order of their importance post-election, and indicates which parties those voters reported to be closest to their views on that issue. The last two columns represent the difference between those naming Labour and National, and the difference between those naming parties of the left (Labour, PC, Alliance, Green) and right (National, NZ First, and Act). Health, the most important issue, was Labour's, but National level-pegged with Labour on education. The left won on education only due to those who were closer to Green and Alliance policies. Law and order was Act's issue, and the left lost badly on that dimension. However, the environment was not surprisingly the Greens' issue. Labour won on the economy, but the left in general was still at a disadvantage. Act and the right won on tax. The rest of the issues were cited by less than 5 per cent of voters. Labour and the left won on general political discontent: a cluster of concerns related to trust in politicians and democratic accountability, and on superannuation and unemployment. Discontent about the moral fabric of society was United Future's issue. Immigration and matters Maori were New Zealand First's. The left won on welfare and the right (particularly National) won on defence. But this was a concern of only one per cent. Labour won on six issues, National only on two, but so did Act and New Zealand First.

Figure 6: Party Closest to People's Most Important Personal Issue



The war on issues appears more even than the result of the election might suggest. Indeed, Figure 6 suggests that Labour and the left in general lost much ground when people considered which party's position was closest to their own views on the issue they held most important. Much of Labour's loss was early, and even before the resurgence of the 'paintergate' issue. However, the parties of the right gained throughout most of the campaign but lost much of their momentum by the time of the election. National made gains after 'corngate' but lost momentum after the 'worm' debate.

Summing Up Campaign Change

The panel design of the NZES makes possible a close analysis of campaign effects. It is based on a change model: that is, the dependent variable is reported vote (validated from the marked electoral rolls, and therefore adjusting for respondent over-report of vote). Table 3 reports descriptives for the independent variables and their effects on vote by way of probabilities calculated from a series of six binomial logistic regressions, each against those who voted for the party concerned, versus those who did not (including nonvoters).

Table 3: The Effects of the Campaign on Voting Choices: Descriptives and Probabilities

	min>max	Labour		National		Act	
		mean	prb	mean	prb	mean	prb
Trend	1 to 36	18.80	-0.08	18.80	0.11	18.80	0.01
Female	0-1	0.53	0.02	0.53	-0.01	0.53	0.00
Age	18-91	48.20	0.21 **	48.20	0.08 **	48.20	-0.02
Union	0-1	0.17	0.09 **	0.17	-0.02	0.17	0.01
Manual	0-1	0.25	-0.05 *	0.25	-0.03 **	0.25	-0.01
Party ID	0-1	0.30	0.17 **	0.23	0.11 **	0.01	0.07 *
Campaign Intent	0-1	0.45	0.50 **	0.23	0.37 **	0.06	0.41 **
Leader Change	-1 to +1	.05	0.22 **	0.05	0.11 **	-0.01	-0.11 **
Issue Change	-1 to +1	-.04	0.11 **	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.14 **
Campbell	0-1	0.50	-0.05	0.50	0.01	0.50	-0.02
Painting	0-1	0.42	-0.11 *	0.42	0.03	0.42	0.00
Worm	0-1	0.66	-0.11 *	0.66	0.00	0.66	0.01
Poll Difference	-14 to 0	-9.30	-0.18				0.03
	-7 to 2			-2.33	0.00		
	0 to 5					3.16	0.03
R Squared			0.33		0.39		0.34
		NZ First		Green		United	
	min>max	mean	prb	mean	prb	mean	prb
Trend	1 to 36	18.80	-0.09	18.80	0.02	18.80	-0.06
Female	0-1	0.53	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.53	-0.02 **
Age	18-91	48.20	0.06 **	48.20	0.00	48.20	0.00
Union	0-1	0.17	0.01	0.17	0.00	0.17	0.01
Manual	0-1	0.25	0.00	0.25	-0.01	0.25	-0.02 *
Party ID	0-1	0.02	0.56	0.03	0.04 **	0	-0.02
Campaign Intent	0-1	0.07	0.04 **	0.08	0.37 **	0.02	0.79 **
Leader Change	-1 to +1	-0.02	0.07 **	0.02	-0.02	0	0.17 **
Issue Change	-1 to +1	0.04	0.17 **	0.01	0.04 **	0.03	0.33 **
Campbell	0-1	0.50	0.03	0.50	-0.01	0.50	-0.02
Painting	0-1	0.42	0.00	0.42	0.01	0.42	-0.01
Worm	0-1	0.66	-0.04 *	0.66	0.01	0.66	0.00
Poll Difference	0 to 7.5	3.88	-0.03				
	-2 to 2			0.18	-0.01		
	-1.2 to 5.4					3.97	0.02
R Squared			0.34		0.43		0.24

** significant at $p > .01$

*significant at $p < .05$

The key control variable is campaign voting intention. Respondents' first interviews were spread throughout the campaign, giving the analysis comprehensive coverage. Additional control variables are applied logically prior to campaign intention: identification with the party concerned, sex, age, occupation (manual/nonmanual) and union versus non-union household. Another control variable tests for trend effects during the campaign – the first day scores one through to the last day at 36.

The independent variables of most interest are:

- change in party most favoured on the issue most important to the respondent;
- change in party leader as preferred Prime Minister;
- difference between the last poll before the election and the last poll before the respondent was interviewed during the campaign;
- a dummy variable to test change between the pre- and post Campbell interview effect;
- a dummy variable to test change between the pre- and post English 'paintergate' attack;
- a dummy variable to test the effects of the worm debate in which Peter Dunne did so well.

Probabilities are calculated between the minimums and maximums of the independent variables. Labour's campaign fortunes were influenced by appreciation of Helen Clark, who, in the end, pulled Labour upward. To a lesser extent, there was a shift away from Labour on the issues most important to voters. Paintergate and the United-favouring work debate had effects (net of the campaign trend against Labour), but not the Campbell interview. The worm debate had negative effects on New Zealand First, as well, but nothing positive for United. This is surprising, but in a restricted model containing nothing but prior United intention and the worm, there is an effect. In the full model, it appears to flow through leader and issue preferences. In other words, there was substance to the United upsurge, prompted though it was by a media event. The parties most effective at mobilising issue effects were Act, New Zealand First, and United. National singularly failed to do so.

Conclusions

This paper began by addressing the question: what happened during the campaign to produce a relatively unexpected outcome. Why did Labour do worse than expected? Why did National do even much worse? National failed to mobilise on any issue, while its centre-right rivals did so effectively. Like another far more serious battle on which Helen Clark has made famous comments recently, Labour's 2002 election campaign did not go according to plan. Clark lost credibility, and Labour's issue mobilisation was weak. Labour came out of the election well because it began the campaign from a peak, and could afford its losses. And Clark, in the end, made up much of the ground lost on leadership.

Contrary to earlier analysis relying on pre-election data alone (Vowles 2002b), it appears that of the key events, it was not the Campbell interview but 'paintergate' and 'the worm' that did most damage to Labour. This is surprising as distrust and doubt of the government remained, even after the election. Only a quarter of respondents answered 'no' to the question: 'Do you believe that genetically modified corn was grown in New Zealand in summer 2000-2001 and that the government failed

to inform the public about it? 38 per cent answered 'yes' and 36 per cent 'don't know' (N=4196). But perhaps distrust is so embedded in New Zealand politics that this deficit simply no longer mattered.

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Appendix

Tabel A1 Polls, New Zealand Election Campaign 2002

Field	Day	Release	Company	National	Labour	Alliance	NZF	Act	Green	United	PC
4-9 Jun		10-Jun	NFO	24	56	1.2	3.1	3.9	9	0	0
10-13 June		16-Jun	CB	27	53	0.5	3.2	4	9	0	1.7
21-25 Jun	6	26-Jun	Digipoll	26	52	0.5	3.8	4.4	8	0.6	1.5
24-27 June	10	30-Jun	CB	30	51	0.6	2.5	5	7	0.4	0.8
28-Jun/2-Jul	13	3-Jul	Digipoll	25	51		4.4	6	10		1.4
27-Jun/3 Jul	14	4-Jul	NFO	24	51	1.1	5.7	5	11	0	1.1
5-9 July	20	10-Jul	Digipoll	25	48		6	6	10		1.5
4-9 July	21	11-Jul	NFO	24	48	1.2	8	6	8	0.9	0.8
8-11 July	24	14-Jul	CB	27	46	0.5	6	8	9	1.1	0.5
11-15 Jul	27	17-Jul	Digipoll	23	47	0.4	8	5.5	11	1.1	1.3
11-16 Jul	28	18-Jul	NFO	25	46	1.4	8	6	9	0.7	0.7
18-20 Jul	31	21-Jul	Digipoll	24	41		10	8	7	6.6	
18-24 July	35	25-Jul	NFO	21	43	1.4	8	8	9	3.9	1.2
22-24 July	35	25-Jul	CB	21	44	0.9	10	7	8	4	0.5
21-25 Jul	36	26-Jul	Digipoll	23	39	1.3	10	9	9	5.4	1.4

Variable Definitions, Table 3

Dependent Variable: *Vote for party concerned*=1, Other=0

Female=1, Male=0

Age in years

Manual Household (containing a male manual worker)=1, Other 0

Union Household (containing a union member)=1, Others 0.

Day of Campaign first interviewed, 1-36

Party Identification for party concerned=1, Others=0

Campaign Vote Intention for party concerned=1, Other=0.

Polling. Most recent poll figure for party entered by day of interview of respondent (see Appendix Table above).

Leader Preference Change: Shift away from party leader -1, no change 0, shift to party leader 1.

Issue Preference Change: Shift away from party as closer to respondent's most important issue position -1, no change 0, change to party 1.

Paintergate Report Response: Respondents on days before Paintergate Response 1, Days after response 0.

Campbell Interview: Respondents on days before interview Response 1, Days after response 0.

Dunne's Worm Victory: Respondents on days before worm victory Response 1, Days after response 0.

Table A2 Estimates and Standard Errors, Binomial Logistic Regressions, Table 3

	Labour		National		Act	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Trend	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.04
Female	0.12	0.11	-0.09	0.15	-0.12	0.23
Age	0.02 **	0.00	0.01 **	0.00	-0.01	0.01
Union House	0.45 **	0.16	-0.26	0.26	0.33	0.34
Manual House	-0.29 *	0.13	-0.54 **	0.18	-0.45	0.29
Party ID	0.85 **	0.13	1.16 **	0.17	1.45 *	0.57
Campaign Intent	2.72 **	0.14	2.77 **	0.18	3.59 **	0.28
Leader Change	0.61 **	0.14	0.79 **	0.16	-1.80 **	0.63
Issue Change	0.28 *	0.11	0.23	0.14	1.90 **	0.27
Poll Change	-0.08	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.26	0.17
Campbell	-0.27	0.27	0.19	0.35	-0.85	0.51
Painting	-0.63 *	0.28	0.40	0.35	0.00	0.56
Worm	-0.57 *	0.23	-0.05	0.30	0.61	0.42
Constant	-4.64 **	0.76	-4.38 **	0.45	-4.64 **	1.04
Cases/concordant	2363	80.6	2363	88.4	2354	95.1
R-squared	.33		.39		.34	

	NZ First		Green		United	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Trend	-0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.03
Female	0.05	0.19	-0.16	0.24	-0.60 *	0.22
Age	0.02 **	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Union House	0.23	0.28	0.02	0.33	0.37	0.30
Manual House	0.09	0.21	-0.40	0.29	-0.51 *	0.26
Party ID	0.69	0.44	1.31 **	0.34	-1.17	1.33
Campaign Intent	3.70 **	0.25	3.83 **	0.27	4.96 **	0.53
Leader Change	0.72 *	0.27	-0.46	0.51	1.80 **	0.44
Issue Change	1.56 **	0.24	1.04 **	0.31	2.76 **	0.29
Poll Change	-0.08	0.12	-0.14	0.11	0.08	0.09
Campbell	0.59	0.46	-0.82	0.63	-0.54	0.45
Painting	-0.04	0.43	0.68	0.63	-0.26	0.54
Worm	-0.79 *	0.40	0.29	0.44	-0.03	0.42
Constant	-2.97 **	0.98	-4.63 **	0.57	-2.99 **	0.69
Cases/concordant	2363	93.5	2363	95.9	2363	95.5
R-Squared	.34		.43		.24	

For details on methodology and the full questionnaire see www.nzes.org/2002..